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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation inquires into a theory of learning through an examination of the 
intersection of art and education. With the work of educational theorists who explore how art 
may call our attention to the conflicts and contradictions that reside in education, the 
dissertation asks how we might understand an education that requires intervention. Drawing 
upon Adorno’s philosophical theories of negativity and aesthetics and psychoanalytic theories, 
I suggest that an analysis of the relationship between art and education can be furthered 
through the study of contemporary artists and their works. The focus is on the visual and 
written works of Kara Walker, Christian Boltanski, and Roee Rosen. Three tensions are 
explored: 1) that education resides in the realm of both social discourse and psychical life; 2) 
that education is composed from its limitations and possibilities; and, 3) disruption in a theory 
of learning is both a necessity and a new problem. The dissertation argues that the relationship 
between art and education constitutes a theory of learning that is also a delicate balance 
between the disruption of conflicted conditions and the re-construction of new ideas. Further, it 
is a theory where learning cannot be anticipated, but instead only reported on in retrospect. 
Learning therefore involves the paradox that a possibility for new understandings comes at the 
risk of a failure to understand. 
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CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation inquires into a theory of learning through an examination of the 
intersection of art and education. Many scholars in the field of education suggest that art 
can disrupt us, call us to respond, and, in turn, create new ways of thinking (Britzman, 
2009; Felman, 1992; Simon, 2000; 2005). But, how do we make sense of an education 
that requires intervention? How do we understand an education that is conflicted by 
works of art? What are the subsequent conditions for thinking about this education? 
And, how may art act as a site where the contradictions that lie within our education 
have the potential to incite new ways of thinking? My conceptual project examines these 
questions to suggest that at the crossing of art and education we may see that art 
creates a situation of possibility beyond a critique of education’s shortcomings.  
My discussion engages with theories of philosophy, aesthetics and education to 
analyze the works of three artists: Kara Walker, Christian Boltanski, and Roee Rosen. 
From the fields of philosophy and aesthetics, Adorno (1997; 2008) argues that art can 
be a site for critical reflection on our current societal frameworks through its relation to 
being both artifact and antithesis to society. Apel (2002), Dubois Shaw (2004), Saltzman 
(2006) and Van Alphen (2005; 1997) all suggest that art can communicate the ongoing 
effects of history. Lacan (2006; 2008) also states that works of art can act as metaphors 
for thinking about constructions of subjectivity in society. Arendt (2006a) argues for acts 
of creativity in bringing new ways of thinking and being in the world.  While these 
theorists work within different conceptual frameworks, they share an interest in 
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examining the role of art in constructing and deconstructing knowledge, culture, history, 
and subjectivity. Through their respective theories, they suggest that there is an 
overflow from what is or is not, can and cannot be, contained in discourse. My project 
examines this overflow that occurs in the production and reception of cultural narratives 
to ask: what does the excess bring to teaching and learning? How does encountering 
art create new contradictions in education?  
My interest in examining the excess that occurs in the production of knowledge 
draws upon educational theorists interested in the intersections of the social and 
emotional world and who work within either literary, artistic, or aesthetic frames as a 
mode of educational critique. What they have in common is an attention to the problem 
of education as that which perpetuates limitations to understanding. Britzman (2009) 
states that our internal worlds affect and are affected by our education. And, artists hold 
an ability to express this affectedness, which can bring insight to disavowed narratives 
of history. Simon (2000; 2005) argues that art can bring into education new and 
unsettling engagements with the past that also hold hope for the future. Felman (1992) 
suggests that art can educate through difficulty and dissonance, where a crisis in 
understanding brought about by art can lead to new ways to thinking. Although their 
conversations pertaining to the relationship between art and education take different 
vantage points, Britzman, Simon and Felman propose that in art there is a return of the 
repressed, or the excess of what the social disclaims and that the act of being 
presented with this surplus unsettles education. I draw upon these insights to analyze 
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how a study of art can assist educators in coming to think about frameworks of 
understanding and experience. 
Although varied in subject matter, the visual art of Walker (2002; 2007), Boltanski 
(2002; Boltanski & Grenier, 2009), and Rosen (1997; 2002; 2008) represent a cross-
section of contemporary conceptual artists who trouble our relationships to history, 
memory, culture, and ourselves. These artists produce works that challenge our current 
conceptual frame and they write, speak, and theorize about their work and their process 
of creation. I suggest that through their work and their writing, each artist provides a 
theory of education. Further, I argue that what situates these artists’ works as troubling 
to education is simultaneously what permits them to be a potential site for 
understanding the peculiar place of education as residing in both the social and the 
individual. I explore how and why these artists, their works, and their theories confront 
education with its contradictions. And, I begin to inquire into a theory of learning from 
thinking about the relationship between art and education. 
My inquiry into the relationship between art and education is structured by the 
following questions: How may art open new possibilities for thinking through our current 
frameworks for understanding? What might such a re-examination mean for our 
relations to history, memory, culture and education? And, how can we conceive of a 
theory of learning that is built upon a critique of our social conditions and offered 
through aesthetics? 
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Conceptual Overview of the Project 
 
Education is a situation that both mirrors our socio-cultural understandings and 
makes attempts to come to know living in the world. And, it is particularly education’s 
intertwining relationship with society and the individual that often leads to a resistance to 
any critique of history, reality, memory and culture. Britzman (2009; 2011), Simon 
(2000; 2005), and Felman (1992) all suggest that education leaves to us its excess, an 
excess which, when pronounced, so disturbs our education (and society) that it is often 
ignored. The artists discussed in the dissertation also speak to the failure of our 
frameworks for understanding through their variety of works that challenge 
contemporary notions of history, memory and culture and education. Over the course of 
this study, I propose that each artist is also a theorist and I read their works as 
addressing this excess that our social and cultural frameworks disclaim. I suggest that it 
is through their presentations of works of art aimed at questioning identity, exposing 
gaps in understanding, and presenting society with the flipside of its idealizations that a 
theory of an aesthetic education may be built. 
This section outlines three contemporary themes which build the foundation for 
my dissertation: negativity, historical memory, and aesthetics. Through an exploration of 
these themes, I investigate the relationship between art and education for both its 
conflicts and its possibilities. I begin with a brief discussion of Adorno’s (1999) call to 
education and state how his work influences the three themes of my dissertation. I then 
describe how each theme, while overlapping throughout the dissertation as a whole, 
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finds prime residency within each of the proceeding chapters. I end with some 
culminating methodological questions that are brought to the work of each artist. 
Adorno (1999) tells us that education, like society, is built on ideals. These ideals 
drive the actions of our culture and the consciousness of individuals through the lens of 
what is seen as the betterment of society. He warns that this process of creating and 
following idealized structures produces a dangerous undertone to our culture. That is, 
through the formation of an idealization there is simultaneously a formation of an “anti-
idealization.” This dual force of what is and is not acceptable in society can drive people 
“toward the unspeakable” without thinking about the repercussions of their actions (p. 
191). Adorno understands this state of our social condition as a recapitulation of the 
historical conditions, and that any education “After Auschwitz” should have the primary 
concern of ensuring such atrocities never happen again. But, he warns, our social and 
cultural conditions can be read as holding traces of the past through an ongoing 
“coldness” of the present (p. 198). This coldness, he explains, takes shape through “a 
deficient libidinal relationship to other persons” (p. 198). He insists that he is not 
“preaching love”—as he believes that is a futile pursuit. Instead, he is trying to draw our 
attention to a level of indifference held towards other persons; at least those others for 
whom we have no direct relation. It is a collective that puts focus on one’s own interests 
ahead of the interests of others to the extent where consideration for, and identification 
with, others can be blinded by this cold, and selfish, pursuit (pp. 198-200). 
To bring attention to the conditions that foster this coldness, Adorno proposes a 
theory of learning that is built upon a critique of our current frameworks for 
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understanding. He states that hope for change in our socio-cultural conditions lies in an 
approach to education that is in drastic contrast to the culturally consuming power of 
idealized structures; an approach, he calls, a “turn to the subject” (p. 193). This turn to 
the subject has the possibility to bring awareness to the power of the collective that 
oversees and manages our culture through a process of critical self-reflection. Through 
self-reflection, we may heighten our cultural consciousness to the power of 
collectivization and the dangers that can ensue (pp. 193-197). Adorno proposes a 
theory of learning that takes place through a critique of idealized structures in society 
and a reflection on how these structures relate to unspeakable narratives of the past. 
He suggests that through the display of possibilities of resistance we may be able to 
rethink and engage with positions other than those driven by the powers of collectivity. 
Through an engagement with something that asks us to question what our social and 
political conditions allow, as made possible through art, we may learn about the societal 
forces that guide our cultural conditions (pp. 201-204).  
In sum, for Adorno: “The only education that has any sense at all is an education 
toward critical self-reflection” (p. 194). And it is with this goal in mind where I turn to 
themes of negativity, historical memory, and aesthetics as read through the works of 
Walker, Boltanski and Rosen. Through these themes and these artists’ works, I begin to 
theorize what an education of critical self-reflection might look like through an 
examination of the relationship between aesthetics and education. 
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Negativity and Walker 
Typical connotations of the concept of negativity are: awful, wrong, less than 
ideal. For Walker, the disruptive nature of her works has led to many criticisms of her art 
through these connotations. But, it is particularly the connotation of negativity as less 
than ideal that is so interesting to reconsider education. In her works, Walker offers a 
critique of African-American history, as well as current cultural conditions, through a 
series of images that are a mixture of beautiful and grotesque, tranquil and violent, real 
and fantasized. I examine debates around her work to ask: How might we read the 
anxieties brought about by Walker’s work? And, what might her work bring to bear on 
education?   
In this discussion of the work of the negative as represented in Walker’s work, I 
bring Britzman’s (2009) educational theory into conversation with Adorno’s (2008) 
theory of negative dialectics and Reinhardt’s (2007) aesthetic theory and discussion of 
the uncanny to examine the anxieties around her work as well as its possibilities. 
Common to Britzman, Adorno, and Reinhardt is the ability for artists to present us with 
what has been repressed, or disavowed, in history. All three theorists suggest that 
through art we are re-presented not with new thoughts, but old thoughts in a new form. 
And, through this re-presentation, we are given an opportunity where we may respond 
to both history and the presence of that history today.  
Adorno’s (2008) call for a negative dialectic asks us to examine our social 
conditions through a critique of what is positive and idealized. He argues that through a 
mode of critical self-reflection, a negative dialectic can offer a theory of learning that is 
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derived not from preconceived understandings, but through a critical analysis of how 
preconceived notions shape our understandings of ourselves, as well as our society. 
Britzman (2009) offers us a discussion on the artist’s capability to speak to negative 
histories, narratives, and notions in the world that have not yet been, or could not be, 
symbolized. And, that it is the artist’s capability to hold, tolerate, and express what is 
unknown that may open possibilities for new engagements with the excess of history 
may be redressed. Through an examination of the negative in Walker’s work and its 
reception through a negative dialectic and the work of the uncanny, we can begin to 
think about how a re-examination of negativity and its connotations holds significance in 
trying to understand education’s residency in both the individual and the social.     
Historical Memory and Boltanski 
While all of the chapters address issues of history, Boltanski’s works in particular 
assist us in thinking about our relationship to and with the past. His works draw us to a 
discussion of the possibilities and impossibilities, or limitations in articulating history and 
bringing it into symbolization. I read Boltanski works as objects, or constructions, which 
invite the viewer into a struggle with this state of difficulty.  
Creative works that gesture towards an excess of history, Britzman (2011) 
suggests, may offer this history a “second chance” to be attended to. For Boltanski this 
“second chance” is taken up through the act of creating, what he calls, “intermediate 
narrations” and storytelling through truth and lies in his work. Grenier (2010) describes 
that this interweaving of truth and lies functions to access, and make articulable, 
historical relics that may not be available otherwise. A combination of both truth and 
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lies, and the role of storytelling is also central to Arendt’s (2006) discussion on how 
historical relics become integrated, and made meaningful, to today’s society. She 
argues that change in the world and upon its conditions is predicated upon engagement 
in debate. And, this state of debate takes place when historical truths are brought into 
conversation through an integration with lies and/or storytelling. Through this 
combination of truth and lie historical truths may become accessible and, in turn, 
influence the state of the world’s conditions.  
Aesthetics and Rosen 
The theme of aesthetics takes primacy in the Rosen chapter while also speaking 
back to themes of historical memory and negativity. In his work on aesthetics, Adorno 
(1997) suggests that art holds a paradoxical relation to society; that it is both inspired by 
society while at the same time an expression of what this society cannot tolerate. And, 
he argues, art can speak back to the world and offer an opportunity for a critical self-
reflection of our conditions, what he calls, the aesthetics experience. Rosen’s disruptive 
works are read as holding the potential to bring us towards the aesthetics experience. 
But, they are also read as brining questions towards what the aesthetics experience, or 
a bringing of art to education, might mean to a theory of learning. Simon (2000; 2005) 
and Felman (1992) suggest that education requires intervention, disruption, or crisis in 
order for the significance and continued presence of the past to be recognized in the 
world today. Adorno (1997; 1999; 2008) offers a similar critique of, what we can read as 
the needed education of society. The work of this chapter is to ask questions about how 
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we imagine this act of disruption or bringing into crisis, and to examine the tensions that 
reside in a proposition that education requires intervention. 
Culmination of an Aesthetic Education 
The concluding chapter brings together the tensions laid out in the previous 
chapters to discuss what the various theorists and artists collectively offer to a theory of 
education. All of the artists are read as offering a theory of learning through her or his 
work. These learning theories are further read as taking on the problem of our education 
as needing intervention. This last chapter is framed through consideration of how a 
reading of artists and their works may lead to a theory of education that relies on 
intervention that takes place at the intersection of art, education, society and the 
individual.  
Methodology 
To address this problem of an education that requires intervention, I have chosen 
to work with theories of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and aesthetics. While tensions 
exist between these frames of thought, each theoretical perspective can also be read as 
complementary to one another. Philosophy allows for a reading of the question, “How 
do we make sense of an education that requires intervention?” through a broad social 
context of the world and its conditions, where psychoanalysis allows for a reading of 
how our internal worlds shape how we see, and engage with, the world. For example, 
while Adorno’s (1999) call for a “turn to the subject” and Arendt’s (2006) call for the role 
of storyteller both bring the discussion of the social to the individual, psychoanalytic 
theory adds an unconscious dynamic to the subject that affects and is affected by what 
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we are capable of seeing and understanding. Adorno’s (1997) aesthetic theory provides 
a way of reading that encompasses the social and the individual through an 
examination of art as both artefact and antithesis to society.  Art speaks to 
contradictions in our frameworks for understanding, while at the same time points to 
what our socio-cultural frameworks cannot contain. It is art’s ability to speak to what our 
education cannot contain that can at once bring insight to the question of education’s 
need for intervention, while also offer possibility for change in our conditions.  
An aesthetic approach to education allows us to conceptualize a theory of 
learning not simply as a process of acquisition, but as a process that considers how 
what we acquire is contradictory and problematic. In a turn to aesthetics, we can 
consider a theory of learning and of education that takes place through critical reflection 
on both our socio-cultural conditions and how our internal worlds shape and are shaped 
by these conditions.  
Each artist creates works that speak to the large problem of my dissertation: that 
the disavowal of historical narratives continues to be recapitulated in our current 
frameworks for understanding. Although in different ways each artist creates works that 
invite us to reflect upon what our current understandings do not allow us to know. Their 
works, both individually and collectively, can be read as what Adorno (1999) calls, sites 
of resistance. These sites of resistance may provoke a reflection on our current cultural 
conditions, giving the potential for the excess that is created in our education to be 
symbolized. 
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Kara Walker, Christian Boltanski and Roee Rosen are integral to my exploration 
of the relationship between art and education because beyond producing works of art, 
they also each write and theorize about their works. In my reading of these artists, their 
works and theorizations, I consider their works to be not only offering something to 
education, but offering a theory of education. Each artist produces works with a 
historical undertone. Each artist also writes about the ways in which social, historical, 
and political events have, and continue to, shape her or his work. Through the themes 
of negativity, historical memory and aesthetics, I read the works and writings of the 
artists to examine how their works offer a rethinking of education.  
I examine how breakdowns in meaning are represented in the work of Walker, 
Boltanski and Rosen and how this excess of knowledge is theorized. Their works are 
analyzed through the contradictions posed and builds from these tensions and a theory 
of learning that leans upon representations of crisis.  I examine gaps in meaning that 
occur in these works and interpret these gaps as a surplus of history. I discuss how both 
the artists and theorists in the dissertation see their representations as representations, 
which unsettles a conceptualization of education as a process of meaning-making.  
And, I suggest that this process of unsettling, of engaging with disruptive works of art, 
may also be an aesthetic experience. 
Through the themes of negativity and historical memory, I read critical receptions 
to Walker’s works as responding to the unsettling, disruptive, effects her work has on 
our current narratives of history and society. I also draw from Walker’s theorizations on 
conceptions of negativity and history to ask: How may we read her works and writings 
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as offering a negative education? I examine Boltanski’s work with abstract images to 
suggest that his art speaks to the limitations of our societal discourse to symbolize and 
express the ongoing effects of history on the present. I discuss Boltanski’s commentary 
on his work to ask: How may his representations of impossibility in understanding also 
be sites of possibility? I read Rosen’s attempts to destabilize understanding as raising 
questions of the work of disruption and crisis in a theory of learning. 
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CHAPTER TWO—AN UNCANNY INSURRECTION: DEBATING 
NEGATIVITY IN THE WORK OF KARA WALKER  
 
 
Figure 1 Walker, K. (2000). Insurrection! (Our Tools Were Rudimentary, Yet We Pressed On). Guggenheim Museum. Retrieved 
from http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/collection-online/artwork/9367 
 
In the late 1990s, Kara Walker was gaining international recognition. At the age 
of 27 she was the youngest recipient of the MacArthur “genius” grant. It was a 
recognition that would at once launch her works to greater levels of appreciation, while 
at the same time spur harsh criticisms of her work. Debates around the highly 
sexualized, racialized, violent images at play in her shadowing narratives were 
prominent in the art community. The International Review of African American Art 
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captured a portion of this debate through a somewhat heated exchange between 
Walker and the journal’s editor.  
After an initial anonymous publication that sided with critics of Walker’s works 
(International Review of African American Art, 1997), Walker wrote a response to the 
journal. She argued that the reported critique of her work was also a personal attack; 
that many of her works and comments were presented out of context; and that the 
strong reactions to her work spoke to its necessity. The very fact that her work evoked 
such a response reiterated the importance of a much needed discussion around the 
meaning that these images still hold today (International Review of African American 
Art, 1998, p. 49).  
In the same issue as Walker’s response, the previously anonymous author now 
named as the editor of the journal, Juliette Bowles, responded to Walker’s claims, in 
part, by saying:  
Kara, considering all of the various types and complex strains of racist imaging in 
black and white Americans, is the most effective way of exorcising its shadow 
by depicting it, as you do in your work—which could have some power but which 
also has a fatuous character and which, imbued with all your flourishes...[and] 
bizarre [bodily] functions, sex and violence, could make you the Jerry Springer of 
the fine arts world—or by dissecting it? (p. 50, emphasis in original) 
Bowles’ question to Walker inferred that she must make a choice to either depict or 
dissect racist imaging in contemporary culture. According to Bowles, Walker could 
depict stereotypes and receive recognition through the flashy, superficial likeness of a 
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tabloid-style talk show host; or, she could reign in the shock and bizarre to make room 
for a less abrasive dissection of contemporary conceptions of race. But, Walker could 
not do both. She could not depict and dissect issues of racial tension, at least not in the 
alleged careless, naïve, approach Bowles claims she was taking to her work. This 
formulation of depiction versus dissection operated, and continues to operate, as the 
foundation for the debates around Walker’s work.   
In this chapter, I look at how the concept of “negativity” is used to describe 
Walker’s images. I begin with an elaborated discussion of how critics of her work warn 
that her images risk a recapitulation of stereotypes and racist conceptions. For her 
critics, negativity is something to be censored, warned of, and closed down because it is 
dangerous and subject to misinterpretation. I then look at how others take up negativity 
in relation to her work. While they acknowledge the highly racialized, sexualized, violent 
nature of her work can be read as negative with the insinuation of it being harmful, or 
perpetuating undesirable representations, they also argue that there is a flipside to this 
negativity. And, that negativity, or negative imagery, may also open a space for a 
rethinking of our current social conditions. The multiplicity of the concept of negativity as 
shown through debates around Walker’s work—the dynamic nature of the negative, 
what it means, how it might be thought of, how it is used—is brought into alignment with 
Adorno's (2008) theory of negative dialectics. In his work on negative dialectics, Adorno 
argues for a state of contemplation on the concepts that create situations for knowing 
and understanding in our socio-political frameworks. Through his proposition that 
concepts are always both more and less than what they are purported to be, he 
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suggests that what is perceived as negative in our social conditions can be used as a 
site for critical reflection on the contradictory nature of society. With this theory in mind, 
we can read that these different uses of the "negative" in the debates around Walker’s 
work—all coalescing, but not collapsing upon one another—bring attention to  the 
contradictory nature of concepts as Adorno suggests. 
I then turn to Mark Reinhardt’s (2007) discussion of the uncanny in relation to 
Walker’s work. He suggests that the concept of the uncanny may help us to think about 
the anxieties over censoring these images and the difficulties inherent in thinking about 
how these images may speak to, or be reflective of, ongoing tensions in our 
sociocultural conditions. I suggest that when a mirroring of Reinhart’s and Adorno’s 
concerns are brought to Deborah Britzman’s (2009) discussions of education, we may 
read that education faces similar struggles in dealing with difficult histories. I suggest 
that Walker’s works may be read as presenting an offer to education where new 
engagements with both history and our current conditions may take place. I end with a 
reading of Walker’s installation, Insurrection! (2000), to suggest that this piece may be 
read as a site for critical reflection of our current state of education. 
The Debates 
 
Bowles’ critique of Walker and her work, draws heavily on the opinion of Betye 
Saar who, many contend, is one of the most notable critics of Walker’s work (Dubois 
Shaw, 2004; Wall, 2010). In 1997 Saar, an African American artist a generation ahead 
of Walker, spearheaded a letter-writing campaign against Walker’s work. Saar called for 
others in the arts and political communities to speak and act against the positive 
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receptions of Walker’s work. One of her concerns was that Walker’s work would feed 
into a racist discourse rather than act against it. Her concerns were inflamed, and 
partially justified by, the overwhelmingly positive reception of Walker’s works by white 
viewers, critics, and artists. Saar’s call implied not only a need for a different orientation 
towards Walker’s work, but also a need for censorship of her images:  
I am writing you, seeking your help, to spread awareness about the 
negative images produced by the young African American artist, Kara 
Walker...Are African Americans being betrayed under the guise of art? Is 
this white backlash, art elitist style?...These images may be in your city 
next. (as cited in International Review of African American Art, 1997, p. 3) 
In her discussion of the reception of Walker’s work, Gwendolyn Dubois Shaw (2004) 
contends that around this same time, the Detroit Institute of Arts pulled one of Walker’s 
images from an exhibit highlighting the work of female African American artists because 
Walker’s images were considered too controversial (p. 103). The interim director, 
Maurice Parrish, reasoned the Institute’s decision by saying: “We believe that it is our 
responsibility to present controversial art in a way that helps our visitors to understand 
the work and the artist’s intent...In this instance, we determined that we could not 
present the work with the appropriate didactic material” (as cited in Dubois Shaw, p. 
105). 
More recently, Howardena Pindell (2009) worked to bring together a collection of, 
what she describes as, “non-pro commentary” (p. vi) on Walker’s work from a range of 
writers, artists, and curators. The contributors articulate a continued shared concern that 
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Walker’s works do nothing more than reiterate racist conceptions and that her works act 
against the struggle of previous generations of African American artists (McCannon, 
2009, p. 54; Snowden, 2009, p. 88; Spriggs, 2009, pp. 93-94). While the authors in the 
collection do, in part, attribute the depictions in Walker’s work to aspects of our social 
conditions, they predominantly attribute the disturbing nature of her work as being a 
result of Walker’s psychological state. For her critics, Walker’s works are a “signal for 
help” (Dulan-Wilson, 2009, p. 26); speak more to her “own racial hang-ups” (Weil, 2009, 
p. 108); or depict that she  “is one sick chick and bad for the business of being Black” 
(Hunt, 2009, p. 33).  
Through this pathologization of Walker, her critics imply that not only is negativity 
at play in Walker’s by way of disturbing images, but that this is a destructive force that 
needs to be closed down, warned of, and censored. And, this dangerous negativity can 
be eliminated through a shutting down of Walker herself. By placing the disruption, 
creation, and influence of the images in the mind of Walker alone and discounting her 
commentary on a larger societal discourse, the critics attempt to frame what it is that 
needs to be contained. Walker is in need of containment. She is dredging up the past. 
And, the eradication of these images and their implications take place through 
pathologizing the artist.  
While her critics do not suggest that issues of race are unaffected by the 
perceptions in contemporary society, they do draw a metaphorical linear narrative of 
progression of the state of race relations in contemporary culture. This narrative is one 
that no longer requires the kind of “sick” or “bizarre” intervention that Walker offers. And, 
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they argue, Walker’s intervention folds back upon, or discounts, the progress that has 
been made through various other artists.  
It is particularly an interesting debate to examine considering these are fellow 
artists, writers and curators. That is, working in the field of artistic representation, I think 
it is safe to assume that many (if not most) of these critics, under other circumstances, 
have found themselves in a position of being against taking such a literal approach to 
interpretation. Yet, in the critique of Walker and her works it seems that they are 
suggesting that Walker is representing the world as it is, or how she sees it to be. Their 
call to censor Walker and her images puts her works in the past where they belong and 
dismisses the possibility of considering Walker as commenting on ongoing relations of 
race, sexuality and violence in our current social conditions. 
This problem of representation is taken up by those on the other side of the 
debate. Sander Gilman (2007) argues that the “negativization” of Walker’s work as 
dangerous and something to be censored, or only presented under conditions where 
“proper interpretation” can be achieved unveils, what he sees as the “double-edged 
sword” of representational art. That is, Gilman argues that representational art is 
“damned” through the idea that it “reflects the ‘real’ world;” and, therefore, it is subject to 
the unrealistic expectation that it should be “nonrepresentational” (p. 32). At the same 
time, any art that evokes negative reactions is presumed to support the struggle that it 
speaks against: “That is, if you show it, you must be an advocate of it; there is no room 
for ironic distance, critical explanation, or thought” (32). The struggle with disturbing 
representations, he argues, can in part be attributed to the power of art to speak to and 
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reveal our fantasies and terrors. The difficulty lies with grappling with these images as 
both products of Walker’s imagination and as social images that address our own 
desires and the current state of social life (p. 33). We can read this struggle being shut 
down in the critiques on Walker’s work as her images are contextualized as belonging 
to her and her alone.  
 Similar sentiments on the operation of the negative in Walker’s pieces are offered 
by Lisa Saltzman and Philippe Vergne. For Saltzman (2006), there is a double meaning 
of the negative that operates in Walker’s work and that allows for more than just a 
reverberation and idealization of stereotypes to take place. She argues that while 
Walker’s works can be read as functioning as a type of reinforcement of cultural 
stereotypes—acting “negatively”—they simultaneously operate through the negative as 
a shadow of a repressed history that perpetually remains and resurfaces through 
current social frameworks (p. 59). She suggests that Walker’s work invites questions 
toward possibilities and limits of thinking and knowing which may allow for new 
engagements with history to take place. For Walker’s critics, the construction of a linear 
progression of the status of social conditions between the past to the present is 
challenged by imagining this shadow that remains.   
 Vergne (2007), too, argues that the negativity at work in Walker’s pieces is not 
one that should be read as a continuation, or reiteration, of cultural stereotypes, but as a 
visual language that critiques the overlooked presence of the past. Walker invokes what 
Vergne calls, a “negative space of representation” which may absorb the dismissive 
way that the black subject and history have been approached in art (p. 14). Her 
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presentation of sexually deviant acts and alleged excess are parceled with a reading of 
society’s perception and treatment of history (p. 23). For Vergne, Walker’s process 
draws from negative conceptions, not from the vantage of the perpetuation for repeat, 
but for the possibility for thinking and reframing what he calls the “historical hangover in 
the present” (p. 25). 
 Gilman, Saltzman, and Vergne argue for a difference between perpetuating 
negative stereotypes and utilizing negativity as an opening for thinking about a shadow 
of history that remains. They ask why our imaginations may deceive us and question 
what might help alleviate the “historical hangover.” But, what makes this distinction 
between depiction and dissection and repetition and reframing so difficult to maintain? 
How do we understand these anxieties around managing and censoring the negative?  
Reading the Negative: Walker’s Fantasies and Ours 
 
To consider these difficult questions, I take a two-pronged approach. First, I 
examine the work of Adorno (2008) to suggest that part of what makes this distinction 
between perpetuation and utilization so difficult to maintain is a tension he observes in 
his work on negative dialectics. That is, he suggests that the work of negative dialectics 
is to examine the presence of often ignored underlying discourses that operate within 
our socio-cultural condition. And, the reasons for this ignoring contribute to, and 
perpetuate, their status in our culture. I complement this framework with Reinhardt’s 
(2007) work and his suggestion that Walker leans on uncanny anxiety. I use this dual 
frame as a way to begin a discussion around the double-pronged problem of education: 
that the problem of education lies not only in social discourse, or simply in the individual. 
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Rather, that the problem of education is produced by, and resides within, the doubling of 
conflicts that exist between conditioned ways of thinking in society and the ways that 
individuals experience these conditions and contradictions.  
In his discussion of negative dialectics, Adorno (2008) strives toward a theory of 
dialectics which is “not of identity but of non-identity” (italics original, p. 6). It is a process 
of thinking that questions the contradictions that exist between the concepts we hold 
and utilize in comparison to the things, ideas, subjects and objects which those 
concepts represent (p. 6). It is a way of thinking, reflecting, and contemplating that is not 
focused on the contradictions between concepts, but that asks us to think about the 
contradictions that lie within concepts themselves (p. 7).  
Adorno suggests that the notion of contradiction within concepts occurs on two 
levels—where the concept is both more and less than that to which is refers (pp. 7-8). 
That is, he describes that a concept arrives through a process where an abstraction is 
created to represent a series of associated characteristics or elements. Each 
characteristic or element that has been subsumed under the concept has, in itself, 
different qualities than the concept to which it is associated (pp. 7-8). For example, two 
characteristics that can be thought of as being subsumed under the concept of 
education are knowledge and understanding. Knowledge is not defined as 
understanding, nor is understanding defined as knowledge, but a common element can 
be abstracted from these (as well as other characteristics) to develop the concept of 
education. When the concept of education is then used to define a characteristic such 
as knowledge or understanding, this definition will fall short in that only certain elements 
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of these characteristics can be realized in the concept. It is this “falling short” where 
Adorno states the first meaning of contradiction within the concept exists. That is, “[t]he 
concept is always less than what is subsumed under it” (p. 7).  
The second meaning of the contradiction within the concept occurs because a 
concept is simultaneously more than the culmination of elements or characteristics 
which it represents. Adorno argues that a concept is not simply representative of a unity 
of characteristics or elements; rather, through the process of abstraction, the concept 
becomes “a pointer to something that goes well beyond those [characteristics]...without 
necessarily realizing what this additional element amounts to” (p. 7). For education, this 
would mean that the concept of education is not simply representative of the similarities 
that exist between elements of, say, knowledge, understanding, learning, and teaching; 
but that the concept of education also acts as a descriptor of a situation of education, of 
what it means to educate and be educated, that cannot be fully realized.  
It is through the contradictory nature of concepts—of being both more and less 
than the characteristics or elements which they represent—where Adorno argues that 
“we live in an antagonistic society;” a society that he describes is created and sustained 
by way of the very contradictions which render our understandings problematic (pp. 8-
9). That is, the abstractions we create become concepts. These concepts, as 
mentioned, are always both more and less than the things, situations, objects with 
which they represent—a dual contradiction. But, it is through our management of, and 
engagement with, these contradictory concepts where society resides; where the reality 
created through and of contradictions is mobilized. 
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Adorno aligns his theory of negative dialectics, in part, with critical theory. He 
describes that what both critical theory and negative dialectics have in common is that 
they both bring attention to the subjective nature of theory and thought. Where negative 
dialectics differs, however, is that it goes beyond the critical analysis of subjective 
nature of thought and theory to also analyze the reality through which this subjectivity 
collectively lives. A theory of negative dialectics, therefore, is “not just a process of 
thought but also…a process of affecting things” (p. 20). It is a process of thought that 
not only examines the contradictory nature of the concept—as being both more and less 
than what is subsumed beneath it—but also how “this assertion of the identity of 
concept and thing is inextricably intertwined with the structure of reality itself” (p. 20).  
The idea that the subjective nature of theory and thought also affects the reality 
in which we live, brings questions as to whether our reality—intertwined with, produced 
by, and productive of contradictions—is capable of sustaining the critical analysis of its 
own structure. That is, as Adorno asks, it brings the question of “whether thought can 
bear the idea that a given reality is meaningless and that mind is unable to orientate 
itself; or whether the intellect has become so enfeebled that it finds itself paralysed by 
the idea that all is not well with the world” (p. 20).  
And it is here where we can see this tension being played out in the reactions to 
Walker’s works. Specifically, her critics’ claims against the negativity represented in her 
works can be read as an intolerance to, or resistance towards, examining the possible 
contradictory nature of the society in which we live that supposes a reality that is built 
upon a linear history, and which excludes the possibility that the fabric of our culture 
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continues to be a function of the same patterns of contradiction and conditionedness as 
the past. And, we might read the harsh criticisms of her work as saying, in not so many 
words, that such critical reflection may be too much to bear. 
This tension is also seen in Walker’s depiction of her work of engaging with what 
is negative. She describes that the visceral reactions her works evoke, speaks not only 
to the ongoing stereotypes and racist conceptions in our culture, but also to the failure 
of positive imagery to address these conditions:  
Had positive imaging of the black body to date solved the problem of 
representing blackness and power, thereby ceasing the need for further 
discussion of the issue, the ''black'' and ''white'' bodies in my work would 
be virtually silent. Unfortunately, repeated denials of racist stigmas have 
not killed them…Any sustained approach cannot afford to rely on the 
unstable terrain created by replacing negative absolutes with positive 
ones. (The International Review of African American Art, 1998, p. 48)  
Walker’s critique of the potentially concealing and discarding nature of positive imagery 
aligns with Adorno’s (2008) critique of a lack of critical reflection toward what is 
perceived as positive within our social framework. He argues that within our society the 
concept of positive has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, positive implies that 
something is “given, is postulated” (p. 18). Simultaneously, a positive connotation is one 
that infers something as beneficial, preferable, or ideal (p.18). This dual work of the 
positive in our society—of constructing a framework for concepts as both given as well 
as ideal—creates a situation where “the positive is intrinsically positive in itself” and it is 
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this situation that Adorno criticizes in that there is no one “pausing to ask what is to be 
regarded as positive or whether it is a fallacy” (italics original, p.18).  In other words, the 
concept of positive operates to create and sustain a situation where our societal 
discourse perpetuates what is accepted without stopping to question what exactly it is 
that we are accepting; or, by extension, what is being left out.  
It is in this way—in the perpetuating of the positive without questioning what this 
“positive” is—where Adorno claims that the positive of our society is actually negative; 
“the thing that is to be criticized” (p.18). His theory of negative dialectics asks us to pay 
attention to this negative force of the positive and look to what it leaves behind, 
neglects, excludes in the creation of our societal abstractions. For education this implies 
that education becomes a task where, instead of developing concepts, we are asked 
think of what our current conceptualizations are excluding for us to know.  
Walker, too seems to be arguing for a process of thinking that asks us to put into 
question the contradictions that exist between the concepts we hold and utilize in 
comparison to the things, ideas, subjects and objects which those concepts represent. 
Walker’s works may be read as sites of resistance which speak to the problems that 
exist in our current frameworks for understanding. The gamble, however, as these 
debates suggest is whether the power of the positive as it operates in society will 
negate or tolerate such a critique. 
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Figure 2 Walker, K. (1998). Cut. Collection of Donna and Cargill MacMillan. Retrieved from http://www.art21.org/images/kara-
walker/cut-1998 
 
Figure 3 Walker, K. (1998). Burn. Collection of Jerry and Katherine Speyer. Retrieved from 
http://www.pbs.org/art21/images/kara-walker/burn-1998?slideshow=1 
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Walker’s struggle to engage in this critique is further seen through her images 
Cut (left) and Burn (right). Both were created in 1998 at the height of her criticism. At 
first glance, the silhouette in Cut is a joyful character. She is leaping into the air, her 
arms are swung up above her head, and it seems she is kicking her heals in 
celebration. Only upon a closer examination of the image, does it dawn on the viewer 
that the playful silhouette is also one of torment and despair. The sweeping designs 
above her head that at first seem to suggest the joyful motion of her leaping into the air 
are sprays of blood. She has slit her wrists. Her left hand grips the razor blade and two 
puddles of blood form below. In Burn, the silhouette is also engaging in an act of self-
inflicted violence. A can of lighter fluid drops from her hand as she stands in a ring of 
fire. In neither image is the young girl panicked about what is happening. On the 
contrary, the silhouette in Cut is blissful, in Burn, stoic. 
Raymond (2007) reads both Cut and Burn as representations of a young black 
female slave in the eighteenth century rebelling against the power of the master. Each, 
as an act of revolt against the lack of control in life, is taking control over death. They 
are, he argues, acts of defiance against the master-slave discourse of the eighteenth 
century (pp. 351-354). Dubois Shaw (2004) reads Cut as Walker’s self-portrait reflective 
of Walker’s struggle to deal with harsh criticisms of her work (pp. 125-127). In both of 
these readings Walker’s images act to frame conflicts between the black body and 
societal discourse.  
As well as being part of an installation in 1998, Burn is the image Walker chose 
for the cover of her book, After the Deluge (2007). Walker describes this book as a 
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visual essay inspired by, but not wholly centered on, the events of Hurricane Katrina. 
She suggests that her work aims to speak to the idea that the aftermath of the disaster 
in New Orleans can be a way of reading into the underlying narratives of our current 
social and cultural frameworks; frameworks which recapitulate those of the past. Walker 
states that her art works to represent “the idea that a Black subject in the present tense 
is a container for specific pathologies from the past,” and that she has “asked the 
objects [in her book]…to take a step beyond [their] own borders to connect a series of 
thoughts together related to the fluidity and the failure of containment” (p. 9). Walker is 
asking the objects of her work to speak back to the world and to create points of 
reflection. Her art objects speak—both individually and collectively—not to what we 
know (the factual events of the disaster), but to the stereotypes and contradictions that 
underlay unquestioned narratives. 
Reinhardt’s (2007) discussion offers further insight into how Walker’s works 
speak to the individual. He suggests that the anxiety brought about by Walker’s works 
speaks to the uncanniness of her pieces. Drawing from Freud, he explains that the 
uncanny nature of an experience is brought about by anxiety towards what is being 
experienced not because it is unfamiliar, but because it is a recurrence of something 
held in our mind which has been repressed (pp. 116-117). The uncanny is not unknown 
and foreign, but an experience where we are re-presented with material which we hold. 
This experience of holding in a repressed state brings about anxiety. In Walker’s work, 
Reinhardt argues, it is this anxiety “that seeps off the surfaces...as we who view [her 
work] are urged to confront the bearing of the slave past on the white supremacist 
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present” (p. 116). In her formulation of images which speak to the existence of a 
repressed past, Reinhardt argues that Walker takes on the challenging position of 
representing a fragmented past that “remembers the pieces without putting them back 
together” (p. 118). And, it is through the presentation of these pieces where the 
disturbing uncanny effects may be felt. 
Walker’s use of silhouettes, Reinhardt suggests, intensifies the uncanny feelings 
brought about in her works (p. 118). The silhouettes act as shadows, both familiar and 
unknown, which call for recognition but simultaneously refuse any absolute 
comprehension of what is being represented. They enact a doubling, what he calls, an 
“eerie echo of the self” (p. 118). This doubling is furthered through Walker’s shadows 
that are not simply presented in isolated forms, but which are in action, play, and violent 
performance with one another:  
To look at Walker’s silhouettes is to confront the deeds and misdeeds of 
shadows, shadows acting...of their own volition. The effect is heightened further 
still by the fact that these are portraits not of living bodies but of figures of 
collective fantasy and phobias: they are thus, in a sense, the spectators’ own 
shadows. (p. 119) 
To think of Walker’s work as presenting viewers with their own shadows however 
creates a possibility for engagement with thoughts and preconceptions that relate the 
individual to societal preconceptions. Her work, a shadow drama of uncanny thoughts 
and figures, calls the viewer into their pre-existing play. 
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An uncanny understanding of Walker’s works suggests these images have 
already been censored. Instead of being worried about these images coming to our 
cities next, we are faced with the suggestion that these images already reside in our 
cities and our minds. Reinhardt’s work on the uncanny adds an additional layer of 
complication to the reading of Walker’s works through Adorno’s negative dialectics. It 
allows us to see the additional frame of psychical contradiction that plays out in the 
power of the positive in our culture. Through Reinhardt’s uncanny proposition and 
Adorno’s negative dialectics, the debate around Walker’s work depicts the struggle 
between our strangely familiar selves and the figures, objects, contradictions, and 
fantasies that continue to go unseen.  
This struggle between censorship and possibility, between repression and 
invitation of difficult images and histories, is also one that takes place in our education. 
As Britzman suggests (2009) in her discussion of the possibilities and limitations to 
education, when difficult histories are brought to education they are often met with a 
flood of affect; such affect may 
disavow the reality of these 
histories and the presence these 
histories still hold today (p. 121). 
For Britzman, this difficulty lies not 
only in the social and cultural 
frameworks which disavow certain 
histories and realities, but also in Figure 4 Walker, K. (2000). Insurrection! (Our Tools Were Rudimentary, 
Yet We Pressed On). Guggenheim Museum. Retrieved from 
http://danasewell.ca/VIS/kara_walker.html 
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how our internal worlds shape our attempts to understand and express our living in, and 
with, the world.  
In her discussion of artists and psychoanalysts, and drawing from early 
nineteenth century poet John Keats, Britzman states that artists hold the ability to 
tolerate what is unknown in the world. Artists’ capacity to tolerate and express the 
unknown, a “negative capability,” opens possibilities for understanding (p. 118). An 
artist’s ability to grapple with, hold, and express a struggle with the unknown brings 
emphasis to problems that occur in the process of symbolization: “With the idea of 
negative capability we are permitting the depth of emotional reality as capable of both 
registering the world that cannot be known and signifying how it is that we come to be 
affected” (p. 118). Through their capacity to toggle and create within a space that is 
between phantasy and reality artists present, what Britzman names as, an “uncanny 
index of doubts” to the viewer whereby their works can bring into symbolization that 
which has previously been defended against (p. 113). 
Through the process of coming to understand our negotiation in and between 
these two worlds, Britzman suggests that we can begin to reflect on our responsibility, 
education’s responsibility, to learn about what we do not yet, and may not be able to, 
know (p. 125). Drawing from the work of Hans Loewald, she argues that education 
should not take responsibility for the past—as taking responsibility would revert to a 
cycle of blame, guilt and defense—but should accept responsibility for the past, for our 
ongoing relationship to and with events which preceded us but for which could not be 
represented. In Britzman’s terms, “the past leaves to us its excess, what could not or 
34 
 
 
 
would not be grasped at the time of the event but now must be symbolized” (pp. 123-
124). In other words, in accepting responsibility for the past, we also confront its excess 
and our response to it.  
An Uncanny Insurrection 
 
A look at Walker’s installation, Insurrection! (2000) suggests that through its 
uncanny frame we can study the excess of our history, our continued states of 
contradiction, and our responsibility toward the future. In Insurrection!, viewers walk into 
a room that is covered floor to ceiling in her signature silhouettes. Old school projectors 
are placed strategically on the floor throughout the room. The projectors serve a dual 
function. Unlike some of her earlier works using only a black and white colour scheme, 
gelled overlays of red and blue are placed on the projectors which then add aspects of 
dimension and colour to the background of the characters that play along the wall. As 
viewers walk throughout the installation, the projectors also cast the shadow of the 
viewer unto the wall alongside the silhouette cut outs.  
In the casting of the viewers’ shadows unto the installation, Walker enacts a 
recasting of characters into the drama. Not so much an invitation, the projectors work 
through an insinuation that the viewer is already implicated in the work. The viewer is 
implicated in both the sociocultural conditions the work represents and the conditions 
through which the work is read and conceptualized. The viewers are involved, therefore, 
not into a fantastical drama that belongs to Walker alone, but one that speaks to, and 
draws upon, a series of conceptions that are active in our social conditions.  
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Walker explains that Insurrection! was inspired by the work of Thomas Eakins 
and his surgical theatre paintings. The piece was created through a meditation on the 
performance of 
dismembering in 
relation to slave 
revolts of the 
eighteenth and 
nineteenth 
centuries (Art21). 
The full title: 
Insurrection! Our 
Tools Were 
Rudimentary, Yet We Pressed On speaks to the use of rudimentary objects, such as 
kitchen utensils, which she envisions were used in the revolts (Art21). This title may 
also be read as a metaphor for Walker’s tools in her installation. Her tools—projectors 
and cut paper—are also rudimentary. Yet, her use of these tools creates an interactive 
shadow drama that acts as a revolt against the narratives of both the past and the 
present. Her use of rudimentary objects also works to “press on,” or challenge, the 
frames for knowing and thinking about history and its presence today.  
When thought through the treatment of difficult histories in education, Walker’s 
work may be a site where we are presented, or re-presented, with thoughts and 
narratives that our education has disavowed. Through this re-presentation, we are 
Figure 5 Walker, K. (2000). Insurrection! (Our Tools Were Rudimentary, Yet We Pressed On). 
Guggenheim Museum. Retrieved from http://arttattler.com/archivewalkerwalker.html 
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called to reinterpret the past, this excess of education, as that which could not be 
symbolized at the time but for which we must now accept responsibility. And theories of 
negative dialectics and the uncanny may be read as a frame through which we 
understand artistic works. 
To think education through Adorno’s theory of negative dialectics is to conceive 
of an education that is both contradictory and problematic. The very concept of 
education itself is an abstraction that while operates to signify characteristics of 
education also falls short in this representation. Adorno argues for a theory of 
knowledge acquisition that is not derived from preconceived understandings, but 
instead, from a critical analysis of how preconceived notions shape both our 
understandings of ourselves, as well as our society. Adorno offers us a way of thinking 
about how negativity operates and functions in society. His call for a negative dialectic 
speaks to the struggle of positive imagery to create change in society. Walker’s work 
can be read as taking on the work of the negative dialectic. And the debates around her 
work speak to the challenges inherent in this thinking.  
Through her uncanny play, Walker’s shadowing historical narratives offer a site 
where a flood of affect may give shape to the past in relation to the present. The 
debates over Walker’s work can be read as scenes of education made anxious by 
Walker’s presentation of histories and images which we both hold and have left behind. 
An uncanny reading of Walker’s works may allow us to step outside the need to choose 
between the depiction and dissection of difficult images to a space where we may read 
this anxiety to choose as the presence of an unattended past.  
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Through an examination of the debates and discussions around Walker’s works, 
consideration can start to be given to trying to inquire into a theory of learning that 
intervenes at the dual level of the individual and the social. In the next chapter, I explore 
how even once this dual level of confrontation has been established we are still faced 
with questions of the limits to which intervention and learning can take place. I explore 
how impossibilities or limitations of education within these conditions may be 
considered. 
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CHAPTER THREE—THE ART OF SPEAKING THROUGH 
“INTERMEDIATE NARRATIONS:” CHRISTIAN BOLTANSKI AND THE 
(IM)POSSIBILITIES OF EDUCATION  
 
 This chapter examines Christian Boltanski’s art and writings to ask how his work 
may be used to think about limits to and conceptualizations of education. Where in the 
last chapter Walker’s works pointed us towards an examination of the doubling of 
conflicts of the individual and the social in education, in this chapter Boltanski’s works 
are read as a doubling of conflicts as well. Boltanski’s works help us to examine the 
dual conceptualizations of education that is at once impossible while at the same time 
suggests that impossibilities in understanding may be the disruptive landscapes where 
learning can take place. Boltanski describes his creative process as that of a “failing 
archeologist.” I question whether his process is not as much one of a failing 
archeologist, but one that may be compared to the work of psychoanalytic theory and 
Britzman’s (2011) construction of Freud’s theory of learning in the clinic. Britzman 
claims that Freud drew from impossibilities in understanding formulations that could 
frame these difficulties as potential sites where new learning could take place. Through 
analysis of Boltanski’s Scratch (2002) and Chance (2011), I suggest that Boltanski 
offers a similar practice of drawing from impossibilities in understanding to create works 
that may be sites for learning, and that his works may be read as metaphors for the 
difficulty of learning in education. 
Drawing from Hannah Arendt’s works in “Truth and Politics” (2006b) and “The 
Crisis in Education” (2006a), I suggest that as well as working within the impossible 
professions, education is faced with layered tensions of multiple states of intermediacy. 
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That is, Arendt (2006b) tells us that hope for change in the world is brought about 
through a debate of the world’s conditions that takes place through an intermingling of 
truth and lies in the realm of politics. And, she (2006a) further explains that the potential 
for this debate resides in the pre-political realm of education; where education, and 
educators, hold responsibility for meeting a tension of natality that welcomes new ideas 
into the world while simultaneously preserving the past and present. These tensions—of 
truth, lies, history, politics, and natality—also appear in Boltanski’s pieces. I explore how 
his approach to creating, what Boltanski calls, “intermediate narrations,” may be 
providing a metaphor to think about our educational difficulties. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the role of chance and responsibility in symbolizing our navigation 
of these tensions.  
(Im)Possibilities of History and Education 
 
Christian Boltanski was born to a Jewish father and Catholic mother in Paris on 
September 6, 1944. His birth came just months before the end of the Second World 
War. While Boltanski was too young to remember the events of the war, he describes 
that his childhood was consumed by the aftereffects of a war-torn society. Stories of 
survival and loss circulated his childhood home through family members and friends 
who struggled to comprehend the events they lived through. Boltanski recalls one 
particular story of his father that held, and continues to hold, great significance for him. 
Months before Boltanski was born his parents sought a divorce in order to protect his 
mother and siblings against their Jewish lineage. They staged an argument after which 
Boltanski’s mother told others that her husband had left and that she hoped he would 
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never return.  Unbeknownst to their neighbours, Boltanski’s father did not leave that 
evening, but instead slipped between the floorboards of the family home. According to 
Boltanski, his father would spend nearly a year in hiding waiting for the war to end (Beil, 
p. 53).  
While Boltanski offers little analysis of why this memory holds such significance, 
we may read that there is a metaphorical link between the significance that this memory 
holds and his relation to his works. Boltanski’s work as an artist, he explains, is inspired 
by the struggle he has in articulating his history. In a sense, he too holds his relation to 
this history in the metaphorical floorboards of his house. While what lies beneath the 
surface inspires his work, his creations speak to the impossibility in understanding this 
inspiration from below. And, it is this struggle between creativity and impossibility that 
makes Boltanski’s works significant to education.  
Boltanski’s story of his father,  as well other memories, led to Boltanski’s many 
reflections on the chance of his birth—the timing, the place—that inspired his work into 
how memory, history, and war leave their mark on us and affect us in incomprehensible 
ways. As he describes: 
In principle I’m trying to preserve things; to find the past once more...I try 
to reconstruct [things] like an archeologist...On the one hand I’d like to 
return to these things; on the other hand I realize that is impossible...The 
result [is] a kind of research into the act of creating and reconstructing 
which is always shadowed by failure. (as cited in Beil, 2006, p. 51) 
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Boltanski’s archeological project attempts to reconfigure these memories, that is at once 
his own, and at the same time, a compilation of the aftereffects of a war witnessed 
secondhand. Like the archeologist, the material of his work is made from the fragments 
of a buried history. While his re-collection of these fragments offer a recollection of the 
past, his work at reconstruction will always fall short of the return he desires. This falling 
short is what leads to Boltanski’s feeling that his work, as he puts it, “is always 
shadowed by failure” (p. 51).  
But, perhaps Boltanski’s feeling of his work being shadowed by failure is out of 
line with his use of the archaeologist metaphor. There seems to be a disjuncture 
between Boltanski’s desire for reconstruction (which he uses to connote a re-enactment 
or literal return) and the work of the archaeologist. That is, the work of the archaeologist 
is not to re-enact the past, but, according to my dictionary, is to “study earlier [times] 
through their remains” (Hawker, 2007, p. 27). The archaeologist does not “fail” at 
retuning to the past because the archaeologist is not attempting to return to a previous 
time. The archaeological pursuit assumes a gap between past and present, between 
what was and what remains. It collects relics from the past and makes of that collection 
some kind of significance for today. The work of the archaeologist is better understood 
through a definition of construction, which means to “make by placing parts together” 
that can be either in the physical sense or through an “idea or theory” (Hawker, 2007, p. 
118). When read through a process of a collection and construction, the gaps between 
the history Boltanski’s works gesture towards and the creations he makes from this 
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history do not represent a “failure” to return to history. Instead, they represent an 
opportunity for this collection of relics to bring meaning and significance to today.  
Boltanski’s approach of speaking to difficulties in thinking and the impossibilities 
of knowing is demonstrated in his work. In his early years as an artist, Boltanski created 
a series of short films, one entitled La vie impossible de Christian Boltanski (The 
Impossible Life of Christian Boltanski) (1968). Boltanski describes the film’s inspiration 
as what he felt were the impossibilities “of life itself;” of his struggle to articulate his 
history (Boltanski & Grenier, 2009, pp. 32-43). The film, twelve minutes long, screened 
life-sized puppets alongside actors in series of non-sequential, violent, clips. According 
to Ernst Van Alphen (1997), it was Boltanski’s intention to have these short, violent, 
works placed within larger existing films. Such a placement, Van Alphen argues, would 
have a potentially jarring effect on the viewer because the viewer would not have a 
frame of reference available to understand what had just occurred. This lack of a 
symbolic frame would lead to problems in meaning-making and understanding. And, he 
suggests, in this way Boltanski’s works do not only speak to problems of symbolization, 
they in fact act out the very problem to which they refer (pp. 160-164).  
In this piece, Boltanski’s archeological project is one that collects not relics of a 
well-defined and articulated past, but one that encircles, or encodes, the gaps in his 
history and understanding. He creates an experience for the viewer aimed at “acting 
out” the gaps that are present between him and the history he cannot articulate. While 
his work gestures towards an earlier time, it does not return the viewer to this history, for 
it is the effects of this history that are felt by Boltanski; what is left over, or the excess 
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effects, have been abstracted to create an experience for the viewer. Boltanski’s film 
offers a collection of a fragmented history that is “shadowed by failure.” But, it is not a 
failure archeologically speaking. Instead, it is a failure of understanding brought about, 
or transferred, through his work. 
Readers of psychoanalysis may find this phrasing of construction as an 
archeological project familiar. As Britzman (2011) discusses, Freud often referred to the 
work of the psychoanalyst as that of an archeologist and the work of psychoanalysis as 
an archeological dig. Like the archeologist who attempts to construct meaning from the 
remnants of a lost time, the analyst, too, works to formulate constructions from what 
remains of our each of our histories. These remains gesture towards a previous time but 
nevertheless cannot recapture the past as it once was (p. 53). Psychoanalytic theory 
works to make from obscured artifacts a reimagining of yesterday through an 
understanding of today. This reimagining may, Britzman argues, “give a second chance” 
to the artifacts of our histories—our “shards of experience, wrecked knowledge, [and] 
tattered memories”—that remain (p. 53).  
For Freud (1937/1974), the analyst’s construction differs from the work of the 
archeologist, in that for the archeologist the making of a construction signals a finality to 
the work. Whereas the work of the analyst’s construction is just the “preliminary labour” 
(p. 261). This preliminary labour is then brought into communication with the patient 
who then “constructs a further piece out of the fresh material pouring in upon him” (p. 
262). It is an analytic offering where the one who receives it may find new affective 
meaning through a constructed, rather than instructed, engagement with the material.  
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In many ways, Boltanski shares not only a metaphor with psychoanalytic theory, 
but a practice; a practice that follows a similar path with a familiar end. He, too, is 
working to take his “shards of experience” and “tattered memories” to create psychical 
and metaphorical constructions that may offer a reimagining of his “yesterdays” for 
today’s experience. In La vie impossible de Christian Boltanski, reimagining takes 
shape in a film which enacts and brings to the viewer the experience of a shard of 
experience. The short, violent, clips disrupt the narrative of the longer film and leave the 
viewer without the tools for understanding and meaning-making. The “second chance” 
does not imply a re-presentation or construction that is now newly articulable, but an act 
of disruption that draws our attention to the unresolved relics that continue to haunt him. 
Paradoxically, the site where these remains are found in the archaeological 
project of psychoanalysis is also the site that impedes their reimagining. For at the crux 
of the dig for new understandings, we look to the unconscious while we continue to be 
subject to, and through, its conditions. While the unconscious is the site of the dig it is 
also the place of the burial; where knowledge, experience, and memories are, Britzman 
and Pitt (2003) claim, both “lost and found” (p. 757). It is a site we at once look towards, 
while also already being present within and can only recognize in retrospect. 
This paradoxical nature of the work of psychoanalysis, Britzman (2009) 
describes, is what led Freud to name it one of the “impossible professions,” also in the 
company of education and government (p. 128). What makes these professions 
impossible is that they take place within a space that is governed by affect and framed 
through the complex and uncertain conflicts that this affect creates: phantasy, anxiety, 
45 
 
 
 
negation, projection, and transference (pp. 127-128). And, they are filtered through both 
our own psychical reality and the realities of others. The uncertainty of how we affect, 
and are affected by, “the impossible professions” brings problems of symbolization not 
only in these professions, but in how these professions interpret, and symbolize, a living 
in and with the world (pp. 130-131).  
In naming these professions impossible, Freud placed these professions in a 
peculiar frame of both stubbornness and fluidity: a stubbornness in our psychical selves 
that refuses to be completely known, categorized, controlled, or without conflict, and a 
fluidity that allows for, and requires, a continual reimagining of how these professions 
affect and are affected by the world. But, what might it mean to work in these 
professions? If education is impossible—never fully known, always conflicted, and 
fraught with problems of symbolization—what might education look like? And, how 
might works of art contribute to this understanding of education? 
In her work on Freud and education, Britzman (2011) offers us entry into this 
discussion through her formulation of, what she sees as, Freud’s theory of learning in 
the clinic. In Britzman’s formulation, Freud approached the impossibility of 
psychoanalytic teaching through an examination of the manifestations this impossibility 
brought about—through its difficulties, rejections, and failures (pp. 19-20). He then built 
from these objections new theoretical constructions which would be utilized to discuss 
the work of, and obstacles to, psychoanalysis:  
It is as if Freud is always addressing a learning subject from the vantage 
of learning from difficulties. Here is where objections to psychoanalysis 
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transform into psychoanalytic objects such as ego 
defenses...constructions in analysis...transference...[and] dreams...These 
“objects” or sticky constructions that describe, recollect, and work through 
the psychological events are also the outcome of psychology and perform 
their emotional work. Further, they lend to Freud performative obstacles 
that pose questions to his theory, to the work of interpretation and, more 
generally, to his style of psychoanalytic transmission. Objections, objects, 
and obstacles constitute psychoanalytic movement...Freud’s approach is 
an on-going commentary on the paradoxical qualities of learning and so 
must accept the rule of over-determination. (pp. 19-20) 
To work within the impossible professions meant that Freud needed to work within a 
space that toggled between a desire to know and a failure to understand, between the 
possible transformative work of psychoanalysis and the obstacles that would impede 
this transformation. Britzman’s formulation—of objections to objects to obstacles—
creates a construction of Freud’s theory of learning that supposes not a shying away 
from impossibility, but a utilization of impossibility as a resource for its articulation. It 
frames difficulties to learning as resources for creativity; and creativity as necessary in 
the play of trying to learn. 
 When placed within Britzman’s formulation, we may read Boltanski’s practice of 
creating art objects as following a similar formulation. That is, Boltanski’s starting point 
for the creation of his work is also the site of impossibility—with the difficulty he has in 
articulating his history. He then, too, takes from these difficulties the material for his 
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creations. His constructions, like La vie impossible de Christian Boltanski, take shape 
not as objects which resolve the conflicts that the materials pose, but act as a 
presentation of those difficulties that may open an opportunity for thinking anew.  Just 
as Britzman describes Freud’s approach as “an ongoing commentary on the 
paradoxical qualities of learning,” Boltanski’s works, too, propose potential for thinking 
anew through obstacles to thinking. 
While Boltanski’s struggles are in one sense his own, his works may also be read 
as speaking to larger issues of history and the ways that the difficulties of history 
continue to act as struggles for education and society today. As one of the impossible 
professions, education is subject to both the world and its attempts at addressing 
others. And, this situation of education suggests that, like psychoanalysis, education is 
in need of objects that may allow us to think about its difficulties. Boltanski’s play with 
impossibility may not only gesture towards a history that remains, but may also give this 
history a “second chance” to be attended to. 
But, what might it mean to give history a second chance? What might an 
education made of second chances look like? And, how might we make sense of an 
education that is predicated on reproaching historical relics that have been left behind? 
Storytelling and Intermediate Narrations 
 
To think of education as having “left things behind” paints a picture of education 
as both unruly and conflicted. It is an education that both learns and refuses to learn. It 
is an education that strives to create change, while simultaneously recapitulates the 
problems it addresses. Working in this paradox, the task of education therefore 
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becomes not only recognizing limitations, but also questioning how historical relics 
come to be and what kind of second chance redress of these relics may lead to a fate 
that is otherwise. 
For Boltanski, his redress to the relics of history takes place not through a direct 
retelling, for the struggle he has with his history is brought about through its 
inaccessibility. Instead, his is one where the gaps between history and narration play a 
part in creating works that enact an experience of living with a history that cannot be 
told. His works make from this struggle, not a re-presentation of history as it once was, 
but representations which act as pointers towards an untold history that remains. It is a 
process that Boltanski describes as creating an “intermediate narration:”  “My idea,” he 
states, “is to always build a path, with progression, twists and turns…an intermediate 
narration, but a narration nonetheless. A vague theme and narration. For me, putting on 
an exhibit is like making a picture” (Boltanski & Grenier, 2009, p. 231).  
To try and understand what Boltanski’s work of creating an “intermediate 
narration,” I turn to his book, Scratch (2002). The book is five pages long. Each page is 
covered front and back with a silvery surface similar to a covering found on lottery 
tickets. Underneath this silver surface lie violent photos taken from the Spanish 
magazine El Caso. The photos are a mixture of victims and perpetrators of violent 
crimes, but the identity of who is who is unknown. Readers can choose to peel away, 
scratch, the paint from the surface, or to leave the book untouched. Once the silvery 
surface is removed, readers are left only to find the grainy, dreadful, photos that lie 
underneath.  
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Through Scratch, Boltanski provides an abstract enactment of his struggle to 
narrate his history. In the creation of his piece, he asks readers to engage in a process 
of uncovering, a process of unveiling, what he does not yet, or is unable to, know or 
understand. His memories also lie beneath a silvery screen. His process is one of 
images without context, with information that does not yet have a narrative. Through his 
process of creating he engages in an uncovering, unveiling, what he does not yet know 
or understand. Through the creation of a work that gestures towards this struggle, 
Boltanski opens a space of intermediate narration; a narration that speaks not directly to 
history, but to his living with a history that resists its symbolization.   
Through this intermediate narration, Boltanski’s readers, too, are given the 
opportunity to engage in a process of uncovering, of revealing, images that cannot be 
processed. The photos are blurred, who is 
presented in the photos is unclear. What is 
being uncovered is presented without context 
or narration. And, it is this impossibility for 
narration, the disjunction between what is seen 
and what can be understood, that represents 
Boltanski’s struggle with his history. The 
mixture of photos—where the identity of the 
victims and the perpetrators are unclear—also 
transfers an additional complication to the reader on the question of culpability over their 
potentially voyeuristic desire to, in a way destroy the book, and to uncover what is 
Figure 6 Boltanski, C. (2002). Scratch. Grahame Galleries. Retrieved 
from http://www.grahamegalleries.com.au/index.php/christian-
boltanski-scratch 
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beneath. Boltanski explains that for himself and the reader his piece represents a 
struggle with knowledge. Both he and the reader can choose to either resist the 
uncovering of the gory images, or take the opportunity to engage in the fearful 
encounter of what may not be able to be understood:  
Beneath the silver-plated surface there are pictures of corpses in a 
dreadful condition. We each have a choice of scraping away at it or not, to 
take part or not. Either one keep the beauty of these silver-plated pages or 
one can choose to see reality. (Grenier, 2010, p. 148)  
In a sense we can read that through Scratch Boltanski is offering the reader a metaphor 
for learning and the difficulties inherent in this process. That is, in order to see what is 
under the silvery screen, the reader must be willing to destroy the “beauty” that these 
pages hold. The book protects both the pages and the reader from what is 
underneath—the unknown. It is a struggle between our desire to know and a fear of 
what we do not yet understand.  
The story that is offered through Scratch is a narrative that runs counter to how 
we typically conceive of education. That is, education is linked to characteristics such as 
knowledge and understanding. We turn to books in education in an attempt to grasp on 
to the concepts that will allow for knowledge and understanding to take place. Scratch, 
on the other hand, offers as a source of education where the situation of understanding 
is confused. Boltanski’s book of blank pages and abstract, nonsensical images is at 
once a symbol of education, and an indicator for what cannot be symbolized. The 
interplay of book and art at work in his piece accentuates the contradictions, gaps, and 
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repressions between history and education. But the interplay of book and art, of book as 
art and art as book, may act as a site to critique the very education that we seek. We 
are faced with a reproach to history.   
In his teaching, Lacan (2008) puts emphasis on examining the use and 
limitations of language in attempts to understand ourselves and the world around us. 
Lacan argues that the origin of our understanding is language; we come into a place of 
understanding about ourselves and others through the frames with which language 
provides: “not only is man born into language in precisely the way he is born in to the 
world; he is born through language” (p. 27). In other words, unlike the common 
conception that we create and construct language through the influence of how we see 
the world, Lacan argues that language constructs our understandings of how and what 
we are capable of seeing. For education this would mean that education does not 
construct knowledge, but that knowledge is itself a construction of language to which 
education refers.  
Boltanski’s works gesture to the limits of language and his struggles to narrate 
may be read as struggles to live within and understand his history within the constructs 
and confines of currently available language. His work with intermediate narrations 
speaks to the point at which he, and his history, bump up against the limits of linguistic 
possibility. And more so than giving a perfectly narrated story to his viewers, his pieces 
acts as a pointer to the limits of language, that may be read as the larger message of 
the works. His work operates to bring a struggle to the viewers, not in the particular, but 
in the abstract. Where we are thrown into encounters where available language just will 
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not do. And it is this struggle with language, where the abstract story of Boltanski’s 
experience takes shape—where the problem with language, the insufficiency of 
language—where language cannot.  
Lacan (2008) states that it is the work of the analyst to provide a scaffolding to 
assist the patient in unfolding the constructs through which her subjectivity and 
knowledge is formed; constructs which the analyst herself is also subject through (pp. 
110-11).  The patient does not seek help from the analyst about what is privileged 
knowledge that the analyst holds and she does not, but about rather what cannot be 
known at all (p. 111). Through the scaffolding of the analyst, the subject can become 
aware of her resistances, defenses, and their operation.  
In his “Seminar on the ‘Purloined Letter’” (2006), Lacan suggests that works of 
art may provide this scaffolding technique both in and outside the analytic setting. He 
gives a reading of Edgar Allen Poe’s mystery tale as a way of providing a metaphor for 
his theory of subject formation in relation to symbolic order. He argues that meaning is 
brought to the characters in the story in relation to their position to the letter. And, that 
the letter in the story acts as a signifier to where “the letter is…the true subject of the 
tale” (p. 21). That is, the characters do not make meaning of the letter, but the letter, in 
its position throughout the story, makes meaning of the characters (pp. 19-21). This 
metaphor works to explicate his position of the subject in relation to language—that 
subjects do not make meaning through language, but that language constructs 
subjectivity and possibilities for meaning.  
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Boltanski’s book, Scratch, and his description of “intermediate narrations,” may 
also be read as tools through which he uses metaphor to scaffold a reading of the 
excess of history and the struggle to bring that excess into symbolization. With this 
scaffolding, viewers may be provoked to encounter, not a knowledge that Boltanski or 
his art holds and they do not, but a knowledge that slips away from our current 
frameworks for understanding. 
Along with considering Boltanski’s constructions of “intermediate narrations” as 
being representative of a gap in language, we may also read this state of intermediacy 
through Apel’s (2002) study of contemporary representations of the Holocaust. She 
argues that art can operate as a form of expression towards the ongoing personal and 
political effects this history has on the present. She calls this expression a form of 
“secondary witnessing” (pp. 7-8). This “secondary witnessing” comes from artists born 
after the Holocaust, who attempt to communicate the effects of history. Apel argues that 
in their attempt to communicate these after-effects, artists encounter a resistance to 
representation that is twofold: they are attempting to represent the effects of events 
which they did not live through themselves; and,  the concept of representation requires 
an identifiable referent, but this referent is resisted by the horrific nature of the events of 
the Holocaust and the refusal of these events to be historicized (pp. 3-4). It is here—at 
the site of resistance to representation—where Apel argues that art can perform as an 
expression of the inexpressible. Art can allow for a form of communication that is 
“nonnarrative and noncognitive;” a form of communication that can draw our attention to 
the blind spots of history, society and sociality (pp. 3-5). She suggests that visual art 
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affects us, unsettles us, and surprises us because it speaks to us through unspeakable 
forms (p. 3). And, it is through the interplay of representation and resistance where new 
understandings of the present and for the future, occur.  
Grenier (2010) reads the pedagogy offered in Boltanski’s work as one that 
attempts “not to instruct, but to disorientate the viewer” (p. 129). It is through his work to 
navigate in a space between affect and meaning where, she argues, his work offers a 
site for fluid interpretations:  
Because his art speaks to life and is, as he says, an ‘art of emotion,’ it 
embraces the whole gamut of consciousness, from the lightest to the 
darkest. The absurdity of life, the absurdity of the human condition, by 
which he was struck at a very early age, present his work from issuing 
diktats, from constituting itself as an absolute reference. (p. 129) 
According to Grenier, Boltanski’s works offer not a stable, objective, point of reference, 
but locations where temporality prefaces any attempt at understanding.  
Boltanski describes a certain fluidity to this place of intermediacy as the role of 
both truth and lies in his works: 
I’m an incredible liar. I think lying is a positive thing. Lies fix up life and 
make it more beautiful...Art represents a lie that unveils a truth—not a 
personal truth, but an exemplary, general truth. It isn’t the truth of ‘me’ but 
of ‘us,’ the essential truth. (Boltanski & Grenier, 2009, p. 238)  
For Boltanski, it is the work of lies, the work of art, to take what is harsh and true in the 
world and transform it into a more tolerable form. While his works take shape through 
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art and lies, they do not deny truth. On the contrary, his works are inextricably linked to 
a truth. It is a truth that is not hidden through art, but exposed through its creation. For 
Boltanski, this blending of truth and lies is not only important to art, but is art itself: “I’ve 
told my story so many times that my story is both true and false, a mixture of the two—
it’s become a work of art” (p. 153). 
Grenier’s (2010) analysis of Boltanski and his works has led to her assertion that 
truth is only attainable through an intermingling with lies. And, this state of affairs, she 
argues, has led Boltanski to adopt a strategy of storytelling in his works:     
 Whenever someone asks Christian Boltanski about the meaning of his 
works, he adopts the strategy of storytelling and formulates indirect 
answers set in imaginary worlds inhabited by both the questioner and the 
artist…They all converge…on one central idea: that memory is possible 
through telling and only through telling. All the stories speak of lies and 
truth as one and the same thing, because in art a lie is constitutive of truth 
and the truth is only attainable through lying. In doing this, these narratives 
and legends weave verbal circles around the artist’s world; they allow 
access, but they also get his oeuvre across—an oeuvre that, because it 
speaks of transmission, should be easy to transmit. (p. 5)  
Boltanski and Grenier take the position that the intermingling of truth and lies, not the 
severing, is the driving force which may allow for a communication of truth that may not 
otherwise be possible. Art is a lie, but a lie that carries with it access to a truth. 
Boltanski’s stories act to redress history and encase these relics in a new form.  
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The role of the storyteller is also one that functions in Arendt’s (2006b) 
discussion of the role of truth and lies in politics. She argues that for historical relics to 
be integrated into a conversation of the state of the world in such a way that may bring 
about change, an approach to history must go beyond recognition of the past to making 
from the past meaningful narratives for today. And, in the act of engaging with history, 
these narratives take place within a state of intermediacy, where both truth and lies 
must be present. 
In her discussion of the role of truth and lies in politics, Arendt distinguishes 
between, what she calls, “factual truth” and “rational truth.” Rational truth, she explains, 
relates to discoveries in science and philosophy, and is based in the idea that logic 
transcends through time. Drawing from Hobbes, she gives the example that if all 
mathematical books were burned, the rational truth associated with the statement that 
“the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square” would be 
recovered (p. 226). Factual truth, on the other hand, is not afforded such a fate of 
recovery. Factual truth is fragile. Based on events in human history, facts are events 
that no rational thought created, and therefore, no rational effort could recover in the 
event of their loss (p. 227). In that factual truths are comprised of human affairs, they 
are important to the realm of politics. Through the use of facts, opinions can be formed. 
And, it is through the formation and debate of opinion over the state of the world’s 
conditions where the realm of politics and the opportunity for change resides (pp. 233-
234).  
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When facts are presented without opinion, however, they have no use to the 
political realm at all. Arendt describes that both factual truth and rational truth hold in 
common a “stubbornness” that prohibits debate. Facts are what they are, and as long 
as the facts remain true in the situation, there is no room for the content of the truth to 
be questioned (pp. 236-237). In the absence of opinion, facts leave little to occur in the 
political realm in relation to action or change in the world’s circumstances, “the mere 
telling of facts, leads...toward the acceptance of things as they are...Truthfulness...has 
little indeed to contribute to that change of the world and of circumstances which is 
among the most legitimate political activities” (pp. 246-247).  
Arendt warns that in our efforts to avoid the tyrannical nature of truth, the 
opposite—the mere telling of lies—can be equally as dangerous and unproductive. The 
teller of lies can create, what she describes as, an “image,” which, if convincing enough, 
can lead a state of mass delusion (pp. 250-251). In this case, the state of reality may be 
temporarily taken as that of the image. But, Arendt argues, although “images...can 
always be explained and made plausible...they can never compete in stability with that 
which simply is because it happens to be thus and not otherwise” (p. 253). In other 
words, although images can temporarily distort reality and do nothing to advance the 
conditions of human affairs, the stubbornness of truth—that facts are what they are—
will eventually return the political to a state of informed opinion and debate. 
Political action, therefore, must fall between the two extremes of, on the one 
hand, not taking current and historical political facts for granted—as taking facts for 
granted would suggest that nothing can be done to alter the world’s conditions—and the 
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other hand, not denying facts altogether—as denying facts altogether would be a way of 
trying to manipulate the world (p. 254). That is, facts are important to the realm of 
politics, but equally important is the use of opinion through which these facts can be 
formed into arguable positions about the world. Through the formation and debate of 
opinion over the state of the world’s conditions, change to these conditions may be 
possible (pp. 233-234).  
 Outside the political realm, but still important to its function, and striving to speak 
along that same fine line, is the role of, what Arendt calls, “the teller of factual truth.” The 
teller engages her or his listener as she or he “tells a story, and in this story the 
particular facts lose their contingency and acquire some humanly comprehensible 
meaning...To the extent that the teller of factual truth is also a storyteller, he brings 
about that ‘reconciliation with reality’...that transcends mere learnedness” (p. 257).  
Through his process of creating a story, Boltanski is able to loosen the grip on 
the certainty of what is being shared. For, it is a certainty that even he cannot access. In 
doing this, he may be able to open historical truth to the reception of others. His book, 
Scratch, speaks to both truth and lies—the truth of a living with a history that cannot be 
known, and the lies of the representation through which this history is carried. 
Boltanski’s Scratch may act as an object where education may think about the 
obstacles to thinking that occur due to its residence in this state of intermediacy.  
To place education alongside theories of the limits of language and truth and lies 
constructs a theory of education that resides in a place of uncertainty. In the realm of 
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truth, lies and intermediate narrations, we are left wondering how to understand whether 
we are being “educated” at all. 
Newcomers and the Chance of Education 
  
 In reading the stories of education through intermediate narrations of truth and 
lies we are faced with what, on the one hand, seems like a problematic navigation: how 
can we make sense of an education that is made of both truth and lies? On the other 
hand, to think of education as taking place in a state of mediation gives a 
conceptualization of education that places dependency on thinkers and opens 
opportunity for the world to be thought anew. In order for there to be an opportunity for 
the world to be thought anew, Arendt (2006a) argues that there is a partnering paradox 
that needs to be negotiated. That is, opportunity to think anew resides in the newcomers 
to the world. And, it is the responsibility of education to welcome these newcomers, 
while simultaneously protecting the world from the destruction that thinking anew risks 
to bring (p. 182). But, how might education play within this mediation between new and 
old, between rejuvenation and preservation? How can we understand this 
responsibility? 
 Arendt describes that the place of education is one that is “pre-political” (p. 187). 
Unlike the space of politics where debate takes place over the state of the world’s 
conditions, the space of education is one that welcomes the new into the world. These 
newcomers are in a “process of becoming” (p. 182). They do not yet know about the 
world and need to be introduced into the world in order to participate in it (pp. 182-186). 
It is the responsibility of education, of educators, to guide these introductions, to “[point] 
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out the details and [say] to the child: This is our world” (p. 186). It is important, she 
argues, to introduce the world as it is, not as how we wish it to be, or how we think it 
ought to be (p. 186). The introduction of the world as it is, and not as we wish it to be, 
works to preserve this potential new that may then come to make change upon the 
world in the adult life of politics.  
 Education must recognize, she continues, that just as the world is continually 
welcoming the new the time of the old is continually counting down: “Because the world 
is made by mortals it wears out; and 
because it continuously changes its 
inhabitants it runs the risk of 
becoming as mortal as they. To 
preserve the world against the 
mortality of its creators and 
inhabitants it must be constantly set 
right anew” (p. 189). Education, 
therefore, must recognize its own 
mortality for the sake of its 
continuance. Even while this new does not bring with it a guarantee of change, or good 
change, the hope for a world that is different lies in education’s responsibility to take this 
chance (p. 189).  
Boltanski broaches a similar theme of natality, fragility and hope through one of 
his recent installations. In Chance (2011), viewers walk into a room that is occupied by 
Figure 7 Boltanksi, C. (2011). Chance. French Pavilion, Venice Biennale. 
Retrieved from http://fantasticocotidiano.com/latidos-del-corazon-de-
christian-boltanski/ 
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a metal, maze-like, structure. Multiple scaffolds carry dozens of black and white pictures 
of infants around the mental structure at a speed that leaves them almost 
indistinguishable from one another. The string of photos, put together like a string of 
negatives on a film, wind above, around, and in front of viewer like a newspaper press. 
The sound of the rattling reels and shuffling photographs are echoed through the metal 
structure as they weave, twist and turn their way up, down, and around the installation. 
An alarm bell sounds. It is a sound that resembles what you would hear on a factory 
production line. The pictures slow until one is left in the video picture frame. Who is 
chosen to be framed is not predetermined, but a random game of chance.  
At one corner of the installation, viewers are invited to take part in their own 
game of chance. Photos of infants and adults divided into thirds flash unsystematically 
on a television screen. Standing in front of the screen there is a 
post with a button that viewers can push to stop the pictures. Like a 
game of match played on a horizontal slot machine, viewers can 
engage in this game of chance where if they stop the pictures at 
the right moment, a complete photo will appear. But, more likely, 
viewers will be faced with pieces of photos, fragments of identities, 
randomly put together by the “chance” in time when they hit the 
button.  
Figure 8 Boltanksi, C. 
(2011). Chance. French 
Pavilion, Venice Biennale. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.cnap.fr/chance 
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The entire installation is black, silver, metallic, and white. The only colour comes 
from the two large digital counters placed on one side of the room. Each counter—one 
in green, one in red—represents those who are born and those who die, respectively. 
The implied connotation is that 
as quickly as we come into the 
world, we also leave. And, 
how we enter and exit the 
world—where, when, how, to 
what circumstance—is largely 
left to chance.  
Throughout the installation, viewers are invited to participate in a space where 
chance and its connotations may be reflected upon. The chance meeting between the 
pictures scrolling around the metal scaffold catching the eyes of the viewer; the chance 
occurrence, stroke of luck, that a viewer may be able to piece together the faces in the 
game; and the inevitability that there will be faces, identities, in the installation that will 
go without recognition. The play between new and old points us to the fragility of our 
efforts to achieve this balance. Similar to Arendt’s discussion of the role and 
responsibility of education, Boltanski’s works, too, ask the viewer to consider that while 
new ideas for thinking and being in the world may be born with new generations, 
chance opens a space for hope and risk. In terms of responsibility, however, there is a 
theoretical tension between Boltanski’s treatment of the chance of the new and Arendt's 
discussion of natality. As mentioned, Arendt stresses that the chance of natality requires 
Figure 9 Boltanksi, C. (2011). Chance. French Pavilion, Venice Biennale. 
Retrieved from http://acasculpture.blogspot.ca/2011/05/christian-boltanski-
chance-venise.html 
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preservation, and responsibility of that preservation lies in education while also teaching 
the world as it is. Boltanski's piece, however, with its primary focus on chance, random 
creation of identity, and continual mechanical regeneration, almost negates the 
possibility for preservation of the new that is continually created.  
We can read that responsibility, for Boltanski, instead takes shape through a 
discussion of chance versus destiny. He describes that what allows for a potential 
thinking anew is a connotation of chance as one of opportunity, and to avoid the 
potential collapse between chance and destiny: 
The real question is between chance and destiny. If you are a believer you 
can believe that everything is alright somewhere. And, if you are going to 
die tonight it’s because it is [written] somewhere. And you can’t 
understand why it’s good, but perhaps it’s a good thing that you die 
tonight. If you are not a believer, it’s only chance...If you are a 
believer...there’s some kind of reason. If you are not a believer, there is no 
reason. I wish to believe in destiny, but, in fact, I believe in chance. 
(Vimeo)      
To collapse the relationship between chance and destiny paves the way for passive 
compliance and indifference. While a belief in destiny may provide comfort from the 
uncertainty of the new, it also relinquishes our responsibility for the state of the world’s 
conditions. With the fate of world’s conditions predetermined, destined to change in this 
way or that, there is no need to question or debate how things are, how they might be 
otherwise, or to preserve the world in relation to what is new in a way that allows for 
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continuance. To think of chance as an opening of opportunity does not shelter us from 
the discomfort of the unknown, however, it does preserve the space of opinion and 
debate through which thinking may take place. And, it calls upon us to examine these 
opportunities with both a receptive hand and critical eye. It asks us to welcome what is 
new and needed to rejuvenate the world while protecting the world that we care so 
much about.  
Through his construction of works around his inability to narrate his history, 
Boltanski creates works with “blind spots;” gaps and holes that may act as pointers to 
that which our cultural discourse cannot contain. For Boltanski: “The artist brings 
something out that each of us knows but which until then remains hidden. It’s as if the 
artist has a big bag and can pull things out of the bottom of it” (as cited in Grenier, 2010, 
p. 147). Through his work of intermediate narrations on the impossibilities of knowing 
Boltanski offers sites of encounter where the uncertainty that is not tolerated in our 
education, what remains hidden, can be brought to the fore. The story that is offered 
through Boltanski’s book, Scratch, is one where his book of blank pages and abstract, 
nonsensical, images is at once a symbol of education, while at the same time an 
indicator of our conceptual limitations.  
 Art may bring to education objects that speak to its obstacles and objections. 
Through art that interrupts our understandings, education may be given an opportunity 
to reflect on its peculiar frame of stubbornness and fluidity: a stubbornness that limits 
what we know and understand, and a fluidity that allows for, and requires, that we 
rethink our education. Boltanski’s collection and construction of relics of history may 
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bring attention to the unresolved historical remains in our education. His works may 
offer not only the findings of his own archeological project, but also act as an offering to 
education for these relics to be given a chance to be symbolized in education today. 
To think of education as having “left things behind” sketches a drawing of 
education’s playground as both unruly and conflicted. It takes place within a space that 
must recognize problems of symbolization while simultaneously recognize that there is 
no “outside” to these limitations. It is an education that asks that us to loosen the frames 
around absolutes of knowing and not knowing and instead play within a space of 
intermediacy of truth and lies, rejuvenation and continuation. In this space, the task of 
education becomes one where historical relics are brought back into education for a 
second look, a second chance, to consider how things are, how they have been, and 
how they might be otherwise.  
In the next chapter I continue a discussion of the limits and possibilities of 
education through an examination of the work of Roee Rosen and educational theorists 
that call for a disruptive pedagogy through aesthetics. I ask what a pedagogy of 
disruption might mean for education and question the possibilities and limitations of 
such an understanding might offer.  
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CHAPTER FOUR—ROEE ROSEN AND THE PECULIAR PLACE OF A 
DISRUPTIVE PEDAGOGY  
 
In the previous chapter I suggested that a discussion of Christian Boltanski’s 
work offers a glimpse into several of the difficult conditions within our education: the 
impossibility of education, the limits of language, and the role of truth and lies in coming 
to understand history and its place in our current social conditions. I argue that his 
works may be sites for us to reflect on these tensions and bring questions to how we 
conceptualize the (im)possibilities of education. In this chapter, Rosen’s works, Live and 
Die as Eva Braun (1997) and Confessions (2011) and his writings take us to the 
problem of what is at stake in intervening within education. I analyse Rosen’s disturbing 
works and his proposition that his works aim to “destabilize notions of identity” (The 
Israeli Center for Digital Art, 2008) to a conversation of educational theorists Simon 
(2000; 2005) and Felman (1992), and to Adorno’s (1997; 1999) discussion on the role of 
artworks and aesthetic theory. Simon and Felman suggest that our current state of 
education requires disruption, or crisis, as a precondition for learning to take place. 
Adorno offers a similar call for an education of society through critical self-reflection that 
can be offered in the aesthetic experience.  
My reading of Rosen’s works and these theorists is framed by the questions: 
How are we conceptualizing the acts of disruption, destabilization, crisis, surprise, and 
critical self-reflection? And, how does the complex place of education—as residing in 
both the social and the individual—bring questions to theories of the possibility of art in 
conducting, or enabling, this work? That is, these theories lie on both sides of the social 
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and the individual. And, while they converge on two points—that that intervention is 
required and that artworks can enable this intervention—each theorist holds a different 
idea on the process of intervention. Collectively they share a proposition that the 
problem that education, or, in Adorno’s case, society, requires intervention. But, I 
suggest that further discussion is needed on this messy space where this intervention is 
supposed and education resides. 
Provoking Disruption 
 
Rosen, an Israeli conceptual artist and writer, works through the mediums of film, 
writing, painting, and installation (Van Alphen, 2005; Rosen, 1997; 2008). His work 
focuses on troubling conceptions of history, memory, politics, and identity. Rosen states 
that through his work, he attempts to “defy stable notions of identity” and make “parody 
[of] those notions” (The Israeli Center for Digital Art, 2008). He is interested in thinking 
about how troubling our social constructions and understandings of ourselves may lead 
to different relations to and with the past, as well as possibilities for the future. Rosen’s 
book, Live and Die as Eva Braun (1997), is based on the larger installation piece of the 
same name which prompts viewers into a space of scandalous identification with Hitler’s 
mistress. Comprised of a series of black and white prints and accompanying captions, 
Rosen’s work addresses the viewer as viewer, but also addresses the viewer as Eva 
Braun: “Excitement jolts through your body when you hear the steps outside. When he 
opens the door you gasp at the sight of his small mustache. Because you are not only 
Eva it seems menacing, almost monstrous” (as cited in Van Alphen, 2005, p.193). 
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Van Alphen (2005) argues that Rosen’s approach to positioning the viewer in 
relation to the historical perpetrators offers a pedagogy of potential that cannot be 
addressed through victim identification practices. While there is importance in identifying 
with victims, he suggests, there are also some problems. Identification can lead to a 
sense of “victimhood” and a relation to history that disavows any responsibility for the 
continued presence of that history (p. 196). For Van Alphen, this state of victimhood is 
unproductive to educational goals aimed at ensuring the events of the Holocaust never 
happen again: “Victimhood cannot control the future. In contrast, soliciting partial and 
temporary identification with the perpetrators makes one aware of the ease with which 
one can slide into a measure of complicity” (p. 196).  
What is described as a state of “complicity” for Van Alphen, is similar to Adorno’s 
(1999) critique of our societal tendencies to turn a blind eye to our own 
“conditionedness” (p.200). Adorno argues that one of education’s addresses should be 
towards the lack of historical referent in the reality of the present. He contends that 
society operates on, what he calls, a “reified consciousness;” a consciousness which is 
“blinded to all historical past, all insight into one’s own conditionedness, and posits as 
absolute what exists contingently” (p. 200). He claims that we live without 
acknowledgement, or responsibility, for both the origin and fragility of our conditions. 
And, he calls for an education that will address this “reified consciousness” so that the 
impact and relevance of the past can be acknowledged in such a way that will prevent 
repetition and open new possibilities for the future (pp.197-202). 
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Adorno’s call for such an address follows a similar tone as the suggestion he 
presents in his work on negative dialectics. That is, here, too, he proposes that the 
formulation of this reified consciousness is directly related to a lack of critical self-
reflection; a critical reflection that should be taken up by education:  
All political instruction…should be centered upon the idea that Auschwitz 
should never happen again...To do this education must transform itself in 
to sociology, that is, it must teach about the societal play of forces that 
operates beneath the surface of political forms. (p. 203) 
Adorno is arguing for an education that is called to look back on itself. Through this 
process of re-education we can be present with the past, acknowledge its ongoing 
influence on current socio-cultural forms, and attend to its presence in our decisions for 
the future. 
Yet, as Heiser (2010) lays out, such an approach to re-education of difficult 
histories often provokes a tenuous reception:  
There is, obviously, a place for traditional, consoling rituals of 
remembering the dead; but that is not art’s function…Whenever an 
aesthetic form meant to address the Holocaust is anything other than a 
dark stone at which wreaths can be laid, there will always be a vocal 
group who will condemn it as being trite and tasteless…One can’t help but 
think that those who oppose [such projects] do so because of their 
reservations about contemporary art: as if commemoration should be dealt 
with in a predictable format so that it signals acknowledgement of 
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responsibility to the ‘outside’ world while not disturbing the ordinary run of 
things on the ‘inside.’ (pp. 95-96)  
While taken from different vantage points, Heiser, Rosen, Van Alphen and Adorno all 
suggest that intervention is needed in our current relations to, and thinking about, 
history. And, it is a specific kind of intervention that is required. One that necessitates 
acknowledgement that current understandings of social life are predicated on those of 
yesterday. They argue that there is a lack of conscious relation to this intertwined 
connection that must be addressed. Only through a provocation into this condition may 
we recognize our own culpability and vulnerability—a culpability of learning from and 
accepting the past, and a recognition for our vulnerability to the risk of repeating similar 
conditions. Rosen’s efforts to destabilize identity in his work Live and Die as Eva Braun, 
Van Alphen’s reading of this work through his argued position for identification with 
perpetrators, and Adorno’s call for critical reflection, all warn of a repetition of history 
without such a disruption, and the importance of bringing the “outside” world, or history, 
“inside.” But, what does it mean to bring the “outside” world “inside”? How do we think 
about this problem of intervention? 
Bringing the Outside In, or, On Being Affected 
 
Rosen’s, The Confessions of Roee Rosen (2008), aims to frame this problem, or 
difficulty, of bringing the 
outside in. The video work, 
nearly an hour long, screens 
three immigrant women 
Figure 10 Rosen, R. (2008). The Confessions of Roee Rosen. Tel Aviv Center of Contemporary 
Art. Retrieved from http://roeerosen.com/tagged/Confessions 
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reading from a teleprompter Latin transliterations of Rosen’s “confessions” in Hebrew; a 
language which none of the women speak. During each of the monologues, a woman is 
seated behind a desk surrounded by books, photos, and other personal objects. Each is 
given the instruction to read from the teleprompter as well as take direction on their 
physical movements from Rosen himself who stands beside the camera, just out of the 
shot. At one point in the film, one of the women reads Rosen’s confession of pretending 
to be a Jewish Neo-Nazi, and states: “I am about to raise my right arm,” as she stands 
to give a Nazi salute (Appendix: Confession: English Translation, Winter 2011). Each of 
these women pronounces a diatribe of Rosen’s sexual, professional, and familial 
admissions while Rosen takes on the role of puppeteer.  
Rosen has described the unsettling ability of his video works to speak to the 
“instrumental” and “exhibitionistic” nature of confessions in our political climate: “At first 
sight, it seems that a crime or a wound are at the crux of the confession. Actually, the 
confession usually has another motive and the crime or the wound are the means to 
obtain it, and therefore they constitute a form of power” (p. 33). This “other motive” that 
is so blatantly played out in Rosen’s work leaves the viewer at odds, disturbed, even 
feeling responsible for providing a space for this play on power and manipulation to take 
place. Through this play on culpability and questions of responsibility, Rosen’s works 
aim to invoke in the viewer a confrontation with their understandings of themselves.  
Educational theorists have called for a remembrance pedagogy of responsibility. 
Simon (2000) has developed the idea that education can be both a site that takes 
responsibility for traumatic historical memories and a site which refutes the ongoing 
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affectedness that those memories have in the world today (pp. 17-18). He argues for 
remembrance practices which bring affect to our present education. In order for a 
“practice of historical memory” to bring hope for the future and new possibilities, it must 
occur in such a way that it unsettles the present: 
[It must] paradoxically incorporate elements of trauma that disrupt the 
terms of sociality we have forgotten we tolerate...A genuine tomorrow, not 
a repeat of yesterday or today, requires we reassess what we have 
learned and repressed…Because a practice of historical memory must be, 
literally, a re-saying, a further bearing witness to one’s own witness, this 
re-saying is not merely a recall, but always a renewal of the possibility of 
the past, which may innovate and interrupt the performance of the 
present. (pp. 22-23)  
In other words, in order for a practice of historical memory to shape the future, the 
ongoing affectedness of this history must be felt today. And, it is through such 
remembrance practices where we may initiate, “forms of learning that shift and disrupt 
the present, opening one to new ways of perceiving, thinking, and acting” (p. 13). 
 Simon (2005) suggests that a practice of historical memory that can lead to 
different ways of thinking and living with the presence of the past can be thought of as a 
practice of “remembering otherwise” (p. 9). Remembering otherwise, he explains, asks 
us to welcome the histories and memories of others into the present “not simply in the 
didactic sense…but more fundamentally as that which brings me more that I can 
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contain” (p. 10). Through this process of being given more than one can contain, Simon 
argues that new possibilities for “true learning” can take place (p. 10). 
Simon (2000) warns, however, that many educative practices run the risk of 
becoming “object lessons” that can then become “old news, redundant...remembered, 
but then forgotten” (pp. 17-18). Such practices may act as memorial site, where a 
certain kinship between the present and the past can be developed, but where no 
disruption of the present from the past may take place (p. 19). What is needed 
therefore, is a pedagogical practice where the past interrupts the present, and whereby 
we are given “more than [we] can contain” (p. 10). But, at the same time that we feel 
this interruption it must not be felt with such overwhelming force that we become, as 
Simon puts it, “a symptom of a history [we] cannot possess” (p. 10). Instead, we need a 
practice where the act of interruption may open the “possibility for true learning” to take 
place (p. 10). 
In her discussion of an experience with learning through crisis in one of her 
graduate classes, Felman (1992) also suggests that certain engagements with history 
can interrupt the present and create new ways of thinking both in the present and for the 
future. This being brought “more than we can contain,” for Felman, takes shape through 
her argument for a pedagogy that requires crisis and intervention. Felman confronts her 
students with “information that is dissonant, and not just congruent, with everything that 
they have learned beforehand” (italics original, p. 53). Through use of testimonials from 
histories of social discord, Felman constructs a theory of learning. She describes that by 
encountering jarring testimonies, her students’ conceptualizations were brought to the 
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edge of crisis.  But the students’ crisis was not something that Felman planned; their 
anxiety caught her by surprise. Looking back on this event Felman finds a “generic 
story” (p. 52) that can be extrapolated from her experience to show “the validity of a 
generic pedagological event and thus a generic lesson” (p. 53). She creates from this 
experience, a theory that it is not the educator’s intent simply to create a situation that 
throws students deep into their own discord. Rather, the educator’s task is present 
students with history; affects as found in literature and testimony that brings them to the 
edge of crisis and then the teacher’s work is to “recontextualize the crisis and to put it 
back into perspective, to relate the present to the past and to the future and thus 
reintegrate the crisis in a transformed frame of meaning” (p. 54).  
But, what constitutes a surprise or crisis? What objects, testimonies, or artworks 
may enable or provoke such surprise? And, how might we think about the difficulties 
inherent in this process of “recontextualization” and “reintegration”? 
The Peculiar Place of a Disruptive Pedagogy 
 
In order to begin to think about these questions, it is important that we first further 
explore the qualities of artworks and the process of aesthetics as a foundation for a 
discussion about the place and possibilities of art in education. To inquire into this 
foundation of understanding, I turn to Adorno’s (1997) work on aesthetics. For Adorno, 
artworks must be conceived as having, and being received through, their own 
subjectivity. Subjectivity while predicated upon having both a creator and observer, 
however, cannot be limited to those terms:  
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In the artwork the subject is neither the observer nor the creator nor 
absolute spirit, but rather spirit bound up with preformed and mediated by 
the object...Art’s linguistic quality gives rise to reflection over what speaks 
in art; this is its veritable subject, not the individual who makes it or the 
one who receives it. (pp. 166-67) 
The artwork as subject mediates, what Adorno calls, a “We that speaks” (p. 167). This 
“We” is the collective social of our conditions, but not those elements that are particular 
or identifiable. Instead, it speaks to, and reveals, the shared unknown of our conditions: 
“The aesthetic We is a social whole on the horizon of a certain indeterminateness” (p. 
168). While Adorno contends that artworks speak to this shared space, he argues that it 
is particularly this characteristic of the unknowable that aesthetic theory must be 
cautious of imposing any universal theorization (p. 339). For the imposition of any 
universal would impede on the possibilities for critical reflection, and only leave art 
trapped within the precarious position that it attempts to escape. 
The focus of aesthetic theory, and the aesthetics experience, therefore, is a task 
of engagement that is “wary of a priori construction” (p. 345) and that turns to the 
artworks as objects of, and subjects that offer, knowledge in and of themselves:  
Preartistic experience requires projection, yet aesthetic experience—
precisely by virtue of the a priori primacy of subjectivity in it—is a 
countermovement of the subject. It demands something on the order of 
the self-denial of the observer, his capacity to address or recognize what 
aesthetic objects themselves enunciate and what they conceal. Aesthetic 
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experience first of all places the observer at a distance from the object. (p. 
346) 
It is only when the observer is able to place themselves both in relation to, but also at 
distance from, the art object where the aesthetic experience—the address of, and to, 
the object through critical self-reflection—can take place. Adorno explains that the “self-
denial of the observer” takes shape as she struggles to grapple with the content of the 
work and through this struggle is brought towards an understanding of what the works 
reveal and conceal. That is, when thinking of the aesthetic experience, we must put into 
question what we believe to constitute “understanding” to mean, and the process 
through which such a thing might be accomplished. We must consider that beyond 
thinking about the intention of the work, or the preformulated idea it may hold, we must 
take on the task of labouring our experience with the content of the work itself: 
 Artworks are understood only when their experience is brought to the 
level of distinguishing between true and not true or, as a preliminary stage, 
between correct and incorrect. Critique is not externally added into 
aesthetic experience but, rather, is immanent to it. The comprehension of 
an artwork as a complexion of truth brings the work into relation with its 
untruth, for there is no artwork that does not participate in the untruth 
external to it, that of the historical moment. Aesthetics that does not move 
within the perspective of truth fails its task; usually it is culinary. Because 
the element of truth is essential to artworks, they participate in knowledge, 
and this defines the only legitimate relation to them. (pp. 346-47)  
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Similar to Arendt’s and Boltanski’s discussions of the role of truth and lies in artworks in 
the previous chapter, we see this to be of theoretical interest and concern to Adorno as 
well. This precarious place of relation and distance, and trying to decipher between truth 
and lies can also be read through Rosen’s Live and Die as Eva Braun and Confessions. 
In Live and Die, the viewer is called, or demanded upon to relate themselves to the 
story that is being told. Through Rosen’s speaking to the viewer as viewer but also as 
Eva Braun, there is a struggle to defend against this imposed identification within the 
realm of trying to decipher what is true and untrue as presented and felt in interaction 
with the work. The viewer is not Eva Braun, but the disturbing ill effects of the 
identification cause one to question their relation to a history that is both true and not 
true. Similarly with Confessions, the viewer is placed in relation to the seemingly 
puppeteered women who are giving a diatribe of Rosen’s personal and professional 
misgivings. The viewer is called to attend to their positions of distance and relation—
what responsibility do they bear for what is happening?—and to try and decipher from 
the performance questions of: what is the story that is being told? Whose story is it? 
And, to ask what, if any, truth lies within this muddled narrative?   
The work of the aesthetics experience, therefore, is a labour of understanding, 
guided by the artwork and that speaks to the impossibility of what the artwork cannot 
contain (Adorno, 1997, p. 347). And it is this representation of impossibility, that Adorno 
asserts, also inherently holds a possibility for failure; a failure which is predicated on the 
“openness of artworks” but which also gives hold to uncertainty: “no artist knows with 
certainty whether anything will come of what he does, his happiness and his anxiety, 
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which are totally foreign to the contemporary self-understanding of science, subjectively 
registers something objective: the vulnerability of all art” (p. 353-354). Through our 
ability to tolerate this place of unknowing and space of impossibility, we, too, may find 
ourselves vulnerable in the aesthetic experience. It is a vulnerability that may allow us to 
reconsider the contradictions of social life and open us to our own conditionedness.  
 Similar to Walker’s shadowy figures and Boltanski’s intermediate narrations, 
Rosen’s works play on the act of disruption and intervention that operates to bring the 
viewer to question what is happening, what can and cannot be understood. All three 
artists produce works that, while radical, are not so radically unfamiliar that they 
preclude the possibility for any relation. However, the conditions within which these art 
works live, and their dependence on subjectivity, make them vulnerable to a reception 
that may become no reception at all. We can see this anxiety around engaging with the 
impossibilities of knowing in responses to Walker’s works and the call for censorship of 
her images, in Boltanski’s worry of being a “failed archeologist,” or in Heiser’s 
comments on critical response to art that comes in unpredictable forms. All three artists 
offer works that propose an aesthetic movement that oscillates between me and not me, 
relation and distance, truth and lies where a space of vulnerability may also be one of 
critical self-reflection. 
Adorno’s discussion on the possibilities of art to bring us to new understandings 
at the risk of a failure to understand helps us to identify, tease out, and revise some of 
the tensions in trying to imagine a relationship between pedagogy and aesthetics. Many 
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of these tensions can be seen through an examination of Felman’s (1997) propositions 
of what she believes is the role of art in education. She supposes: 
that teaching in itself, teaching as such, takes place precisely only through 
a crisis: if teaching does not hit upon some sort of crisis, if it does not 
encounter either the vulnerability or the explosiveness of a (explicit or 
implicit) critical and unpredictable dimension, it has perhaps not truly 
taught:...I therefore think that my job as a teacher, paradoxically as it may 
sound, [is] that of creating in the class the highest state of crisis that it 
[can] withstand, without ‘driving the students crazy’—without 
compromising the students’ bounds. (italics original, p. 53) 
But, how do we imagine the students’ bounds? How can we anticipate a collective 
“edge of crisis” without imposing both an a priori assumption on the works, as well as 
constructing universals around art and of the students as a collective? Or, how could we 
possibly know when such boundary has been reached? There is a tension created 
when trying to position education in the place of the “generic story.” While this 
construction does speak to education as residing in the social, and therefore is subject 
to collective conditions—as Adorno considers, the collective “We”—this is not the only 
space where education resides. Education also resides in the individual, which, 
paradoxically, in trying to create a “generic lesson” has the effect of washing out the 
complexities of the messiness of this space and the organic potential of what might 
come from its engagement. It is not to say that addresses to, or concerns of, the social, 
or the generic, are not important; however, what is needed is a way to speak of such 
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addresses and concerns that leaves room for the particulars, such as the aesthetic 
experience which occurs on the level of individual critical self-reflection. Otherwise, we 
may miss opportunities to engage with these complexities, and instead only create new 
normative patterns in our social discourse.  
Felman brings attention to the intermingling of the social and the individual in her 
comparison of her pedagogy to that of psychoanalysis:  
There is a parallel between this kind of teaching (in its reliance on the 
testimonial process) and psychoanalysis (in its reliance on the 
psychoanalytic process), insofar as both this teaching and psychoanalysis 
have, in fact, to live through a crisis. Both are called upon to be 
performative, and not just cognitive, insofar as they both strive to produce, 
and to enable, change. Both this kind of teaching and psychoanalysis are 
interested not merely in new information, but, primarily, in the capacity of 
their recipients to transform themselves in function and newness of that 
information. (italics original p. 53) 
While I agree that certain parallels can be made between the type of teaching and 
learning that Felman suggests and that of psychoanalysis, there are also some tensions 
within this comparison. First, rather than being considered a collective undertaking, the 
psychoanalytic process is one of an individual “curriculum.” The very reason Freud 
refused to develop any “generic” “how-to’s” for analysts in his writing was because the 
“curriculum” needed to come from, develop out of, each individual analysand. And, 
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while he resisted creating a handbook for the analyst, he did offer several papers on 
technique that focused on helping the analyst tap into this “individual curriculum” and 
which, through examination, can assist us in further thinking about the tensions of trying 
to bring psychoanalysis to pedagogy. 
 In one of Freud’s (1912/1958) papers on technique, he offers several warnings to 
the analyst, one of which is against making psychoanalysis an educative activity. He 
cautions that when psychoanalysis is treated as an educative activity there is 
simultaneously the creation of aims for progress. And, these aims perform an act of 
attempting to push through resistance that may only exacerbate the problem of not 
learning:  
Educative ambition is of...little use...It must be further borne in mind that 
many people fall ill precisely from an attempt to sublimate their instincts 
beyond the degree permitted by their organization and that in those who 
have a capacity for sublimation the process usually takes place of itself as 
soon as their inhibitions have been overcome by analysis. (p. 119) 
While the application of psychoanalysis in to the realm of education that is our concern 
differs from the one Freud describes, this warning does offer us something to consider. 
That is, while in bringing psychoanalysis to education we do not consider education 
“therapeutic,” we do, as Felman mentions, propose that education will share with 
psychoanalysis a transformative process. And, if it is our goal to share in this 
transformative process, we also become vulnerable to the limitations of the conditions 
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under which this transformation may take place. One of the limitations that Freud 
outlines for us here is that the creation of educational aims may circumvent the 
transformation that we—the analyst or teacher—desire, as the transformative works on 
its own terms. But, what are we to do in this predicament of educative ambitions that 
asks for learning to come too soon? What, then, becomes the role of the teacher?  
 This concern for what then becomes the role of the teacher when educational 
aims are cast aside comes up against another one of Freud’s suggestions, or warnings, 
which is the warning against the therapeutic ambition of the analyst. That is:  
the feeling that is most dangerous to a psychoanalyst is the therapeutic 
ambition to achieve by this novel and much disputed method something 
that will produce a convincing effect on other people. This will not only put 
him into a state of mind which is unfavourable for his work, but will make 
him helpless against certain resistances of the patient. (p. 115)  
We can imagine that the therapeutic ambition of the analyst may also be the achilles 
heel of the teacher, or the idealized condition of education. That it is the desire or hope 
of education, the educator, and those being educated, that education holds the 
possibility transform, affect, those involved—otherwise, what are we doing? But, Freud 
tells us that there is also a risk in this therapeutic (or I would say educational) ambition: 
that our desire to prove to ourselves and to others that our educational ideals and our 
own investments in thinking and learning matter may operate ironically in such a way 
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where our educational investments may act as filters, or blinders, for what we are able, 
or unable, to see and learn. 
 Freud suggests that the most successful place for psychoanalysis is when it 
resides outside of the place of educative aims and professional ambitions and is, 
instead, taken as a thing in and of itself, with its own agenda, and outside of the area of 
research. He warns that when research and treatment coincide, they also oppose one 
another:  
It is not a good thing to work on a case scientifically while treatment is still 
proceeding...Cases which are devoted from the first to scientific purposes 
and are treated accordingly suffer in their outcome; while the most 
successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, without any 
purpose in view, allows oneself to be taken by surprise by any new turn in 
them, and always meets them with an open mind, free from any 
presuppositions...in avoiding speculation or brooding over cases while 
they are in analysis, and in submitting the material obtained to synthetic 
process of thought only after the analysis is concluded. The distinction 
between the two attitudes would be meaningless if we already possessed 
all the knowledge (or a least the essential knowledge) about the 
psychology of the unconscious and about the structure of the neuroses 
that we can obtain from psychoanalytic work. At present we are still far 
from that goal and we ought not to cut ourselves out from the possibility of 
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testing what we have already learnt of extending our knowledge. (pp. 114-
115)  
It is this warning of Freud’s that gets at the crux of my concern, or anxiety, around 
Felman’s approach to trying to create a “generic lesson” from the events that occurred 
in her classroom. We may read that in the construction of a “generic lesson” she is 
offering a “scientific approach” that may foreclose the element of surprise which she 
deems so important. The generic lesson, a presupposition, may assume that we 
“already possess the knowledge” of what bringing testimonial works to a classroom will 
do. It creates a construction that anticipates and projects, where a psychoanalytic 
construction predicates itself on only coming to a place of understanding in retrospect; 
or at least any new understandings, through deferred action. While there is a parallel 
between the type of teaching, or experience, that Felman suggests and the 
psychoanalytic process—both propose to be performative and transformative—we 
come up against the problem that the analysand comes to the analyst already acting 
out, or performing, the symptoms or materials that may be used for transformation. And, 
this is much different than a situation of offering, for instance, a testimonial process, 
where the situation is more one of intervention on a larger scale. It is not to discount the 
potential for this type of intervention, or to say that some type of transformative work 
may be had. But, there is an important layer that is missing in this explication of the 
teaching process and potential. That is, we cannot assume that an intervention, or 
offering, will just be generically absorbed and learned from. And, if we are going to draw 
upon psychoanalysis for considerations of education, we need to give space to one of 
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its foundational principles: any offer or intervention made by education will come into 
contact with the already existing internal psychodramas of the individuals. And, while 
there may be a possibility for reflection on the generic world that we share, that world is 
lived, experienced, and reflected upon uniquely by each of us.  
The problem I outline using Felman’s work is not a problem of hers alone, or one 
that belongs only to the field of psychoanalysis. It is one that may be read through 
amount of attention, or traction, Rosen’s work has received in comparison to other 
artists. That is, Rosen states at many times that through his work he intends to create 
acts of disruption. His works can be paralleled to Walker's for their similarities—they 
both make use of silhouettes, offer a mixture of beautiful and tranquil imagery, and both 
combine aspects of play and disruption. However, Rosen’s works do not seem to 
generate the same amount of discussion. There are factors of location and subject 
matter that could account for this difference. Rosen is an Israeli artist whose works have 
the primary focus on the ongoing effects of the holocaust and Walker is an African 
American artist whose works have primary focus on, or at least receive the most 
attention for, race relations. But, we can also ask: might one of the reasons why 
Rosen’s works do not receive the level of attention as Walker’s be that that nature of his 
works take us to a point that creates further resistance? Might his aims to create 
disruption through his work create a situation where an education of critical self-
reflection is asked to come too soon? Might the aims and ambitions of the work—to 
“disrupt,” “defy” and “make parody” notions of identity—act as anticipatory measures 
that while are performative, circumvent the work’s transformative potential?   
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A reading of these tensions through Felman and Rosen’s works also speaks to 
the larger problem that the dissertation is trying to contend with through the 
interweaving layers of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and aesthetics. While these fields of 
thought approach the problem from different directions, they all coincide on the position 
that learning is derived from what we do not know and accessing what is unknown 
requires disruption or intervention. And, this act of intervention, disruption, or learning is 
simultaneously limited, or even hindered, by current states of our conditions. For 
psychoanalysis, learning is derived from a critical thought and consideration of the 
individual’s psychodramas and simultaneously hindered by the resistances that these 
psychodramas create. The focus of philosophical consideration is not so much on the 
individual psychodramas, but rather through critical reflection and consideration of how 
the individual exists and is constructed through larger sociocultural understandings and 
narratives. Aesthetics resides in a space that overlaps these two fields and absorbs the 
problem of learning from both ends. That is, art and the aesthetic experience can offer a 
place where we are called to question and reflect upon the collective “we” that we share 
and our experiences of it through the laborious task of critical self-reflection. But, this 
possibility for the aesthetic experience is simultaneously rendered vulnerable through 
both our sociocultural and psychical conditions. 
We can read Rosen’s works as opportunities that provoke a destabilization of 
understandings of ourselves and our social conditions. His uncomfortable position of 
viewer as both participant and observer, may allow for an aesthetic experience where 
the content of the objects he presents mediates both truth and non-truth, and asks us to 
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take part in this laborious thinking. However, Rosen’s works and their reception also 
bring questions to whether pedagogy predicated on crisis is possible.  
Some difficult questions still remain: How do we think about a theory of learning 
that simultaneously requires its own deconstruction? What is education if not a forward 
projecting? And, what is the role of the teacher within an educational framework that 
pushes back on pedagogy? In the final concluding chapter, I continue to work with these 
questions as a frame for trying to understand the intersection of possibilities between art 
and education and what a theory of learning might look like at this crossroads.  
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CHAPTER FIVE—CONCLUSION: AN AESTHETIC EDUCATION  
 
Education brings the world to the individual, while at the same time asks the 
individual to situate themselves in relation to the world. The contradictions that exist 
within the social frameworks of society are then compounded in the difficulty of their 
recognition and understanding by the contradictions within the individual. Therefore, the 
problem of education is twofold: the problem of what does or does not remain, or is 
repressed within social discourse, as well as the problem of narration and repression in 
the work of the individual. Given this dual contradiction, we must ask: what requires 
intervention? Is it society that requires intervention, or the individual, or both? Can 
education operate in this contradiction? Education, and the individual are made sense 
of from within the societal discourse, but they can also challenge that discourse and put 
it into question. However, societal discourse will continue to return and make cause for 
further questioning, challenging, and reflection.  
In this conclusion, I reconsider the tensions that have been addressed in the 
previous chapters. I suggest that collectively, the artists and theorists in the thesis offer 
us a series of contradictions of education that can allow us to think about the 
intersection of art and education and difficulties inherent in attempting to construct a 
theory of learning that simultaneously requires deconstruction. I conclude with some 
remarks on what a theory of learning that resides at the intersection of art and education 
may look like. 
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An Intersection of Tensions 
The debates around Walker’s work demonstrate the difficulty of navigating the 
doubling of conflicts between the contradiction of thinking in society and the individual 
experiencing of these conflicts. The pathologization of Walker and calls for censorship 
of her images attempts to contain these tensions through an eradication of her works. 
But, a reading of these debates through Adorno’s (2008) theory of negative dialectics 
asks us to point our attention to these contradictions within, and through which, we 
make sense of ourselves and society. His work suggests that our cultural framework is 
built upon, and functions through, its many contradictions. And, in paying attention 
towards, and reflecting upon, these conflicts changes to our conditions may begin. 
Reinhardt (2007) suggests that when psychical life is considered, how we think and act 
in the world, is not only subject to conflicting social conditions, but also our own internal 
contradictions. While residing in different frames of thought, theories of negative 
dialectics and the uncanny suggest our understandings of ourselves and our 
experiences of living in the world are both more and less than we live them to be. And a 
reading of Walker’s works, as well as the debates that have ensued, act as affective 
pointers to this excess in our contradictions. Britzman (2009) calls attention to the task 
of education to accept responsibility for this excess that has been left to us. And when 
Walker’s works are read as offering a representation of negativity that is not as 
perpetuation, but instead as a reframing of negativity as a source for its articulation, we 
may be starting the process of accepting of the responsibility of the past and attempting 
to bring this excess into symbolization.  
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A reading of Boltanski’s works allows for a continuation of the discussion around 
the work of bringing excess into symbolization; however, his works point to the difficulty 
of this excess as residing in the impossibilities of narrating difficult histories. Boltanski 
works to create constructions, or objects, of representation that invite the viewer into a 
struggle with this state of impossibility. I read his collection of historical relics through 
Britzman’s (2011) formulation of Freud’s theory of learning. She suggests that Freud 
turned objections to psychoanalysis into objects of construction that pointed towards 
obstacles to learning; and that Freud’s theory of learning supposes not a shying away 
from impossibility, but a utilization of impossibility as a resource for its articulation. I 
suggest that Boltanski’s process of creating resembles the one that Britzman lays out 
for Freud. And that Boltanski’s collection of works may offer opportunity for a re-reading 
of the remnants of the past through constructions that articulate their impossibility.  
This redressing of history through creative works, Britzman suggests, may offer 
history a “second chance” to be attended to. But, in considering education as that which 
leaves things behind, we are faced with a paradoxical construction of education: that 
education both creates excess and also may allow for this excess to be redressed. To 
try and understand this education that both learns and refuses to learn, I turn to Lacan’s 
(2006) discussion on the limits of language, where he suggests that language 
constructs our understandings of how and what we are capable of seeing. And, artistic 
works can bring us towards seeing the limitations of our understandings. Boltanski 
describes this work of bringing us to the edge of what is known as the creation of 
intermediate narrations and storytelling through truth and lies. Grenier (2010) describes 
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that Boltanski attempts to disorient, not instruct, the viewer, and that his work is an 
interweaving of truth and lies that allows access to historical relics that may not be 
available otherwise. The role of the storyteller and the function of a combination of both 
truth and lies is also central to Arendt’s (2006b) discussion on how historical relics 
become integrated, and made meaningful, to today’s society. Through a state of debate 
over the world’s conditions, through a combination of factual truth and opinion, we can 
begin to see the world differently. This opportunity for a reimagining of the world’s 
conditions resides in a further balancing of welcoming newcomers into the world and 
simultaneously protecting the world from the potential destruction that this newness may 
bring (Arendt, 2006a).  
This work of trying to understand the possibilities and limitations of education 
through a balancing of several tensions is lastly taken up in an examination of the work 
of Roee Rosen through a consideration of what a call of disruption in education may 
entail. Adorno (1999) tells us that our current social conditions lack historical referent to 
the past. This state of “reified consciousness,” he claims, leaves us blind to the 
conditionedness of the present in relation to the past. And, in order to prevent a 
repetition of historical atrocities, our origins and the fragility of our conditions needs to 
be addressed. The way to this address, Simon (2000; 2005) and Felman (1992) 
suggest, is through a process of disruption or crisis through which the past affects the 
present. Through this process of being affected, our relation to the past and the 
conditionedness of the present can be acknowledged. And, in turn, new hope toward 
the future can take place. The aesthetic “we”, as Adorno (1997) calls it, that can be 
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represented in art speaks to the collective of our social conditions not through what is 
known, but what is a shared state of unknowing and indetermination. And, it is this 
characteristic of art—of being able to gesture towards what is unknown—that allows for 
the aesthetic experience. In the aesthetic experience we enter into an engagement with 
art without a priori construction that allows for art to be subject of knowledge, and not 
just an object of knowledge, that can allow for critical self-reflection. 
 Adorno proposes a paradoxical quality of art: that it holds the possibility to bring 
us to new understandings at the risk of a failure to understand. This paradox allows us 
to think about the relationship between pedagogy and art, interruption and learning that 
is a call to bring art to education without assurance of its success. This lack of 
assurance is not only read through aesthetic theory, but can also be see in the tensions 
of bringing psychoanalysis to pedagogy. Freud (1912/1958) makes note of many 
warnings to the work of psychoanalysis, to which, I argue, education must also heed if 
we wish, as Felman suggests, for education to share a transformative process with 
psychoanalysis. First, educational aims may exacerbate the problem of not learning. 
Through the shared a goal with psychoanalysis for transformation we must also 
recognize the condition that this transformation happens on its own time. Second, our 
investments in our own ideas, theories, and hopes for education may operate ironically 
as blind spots to what we can or cannot see and learn. And, third, we cannot assume 
any act of intervention will be absorbed generically. And, any construction that 
anticipates learning overlooks a foundational aspect of psychoanalytic learning that is 
predicated upon only knowing in retrospect.  
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In many ways, the artists that I am working with in the dissertation all operate 
through a common approach to producing works that point our attention to the multiple 
complexities of navigating a series of intersections between the social and the individual 
where education resides. Walker offers us a negative education, or uncanny 
insurrection with her work that calls us to reflect on an unspeakable history that has not 
been told but continues to be acted out in everyday life. Boltanski also speaks to 
history’s residue and the impossibility of remembrance. Through his intermediate 
narrations, he offers us objects towards which we might encounter questions towards 
the limitations between past and present, impossibility and possibility, truth and lies. 
Rosen also creates works that bring us to questions of relation and distance, truth and 
lies, through his works that implicate, and integrate, the viewer’s experience of the 
works.  All three artists may be read as offering us works that call for critical self-
reflection of our social conditions, but also gesture towards the complicated task of how 
the individual resides and negotiates her own world within the world.  
The Paradox of Learning and an Aesthetic Education 
While any theory assumes construction, to think of a theory of an aesthetic 
education must not become something forward projecting or prescriptive. At the 
moment we anticipate we lose the possibility for surprise. However, we also cannot lean 
too much on the side of deconstruction, for if we do, we have, as Felman puts it, 
crossed the edge of crisis. To think of an aesthetic education, therefore, we find 
ourselves in a paradox: we need both structure and crisis, creation and deconstruction.  
It is a reconfiguration or rethinking of the education we know in order to open a space 
94 
 
 
 
for it to be the education it may become. The balance of this oscillation between 
structure and crisis, or creation and deconstruction, can only be evaluated for its 
repetitions, or thought about in retrospect, and learning becomes an afterthought of the 
experience of education. The construction of trying to propose what will be learned 
through this or that lesson, reading, experience or event becomes problematic, as we 
will now no longer be able to predict what will be learned, but only be able to report back 
on what we have learnt.  
We are challenged with a theory of learning that asks for us to feel our way 
through, and one that only anticipates a hope for learning with the risk of failure. It is a 
theory of learning that allows for a recognition of the multiplicities of histories of learning 
while it disengages from the theoretical ambitions, educational aims, and a priori 
constructions. It embraces opinion and the engagement of truth and lies while moving 
towards a negative dialectic. It is a theory of learning that sees traditional characteristics 
of learning—as being anticipatory and based on what is known—as obstacles to 
learning and where the emphasis on the teacher’s pedagogy is replaced with the role of 
facilitator. The responsibility of and for learning relies with a heavier weight on the 
student, and the teacher’s role is one of helping the students to navigate the experience 
of learning rather than to anticipate how the student may be transformed.  
There is a difficulty and sense of irony in writing any theory of education that is 
based on the intersection of art and education. I worry that I, too, will be writing a 
generic lesson of my experiences in working with these texts, like Felman’s writing of 
her experience of crisis in her classroom. But, there would also be an irony in letting the 
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risk of theoretical collapse preclude an attempt at articulation. Instead, I see the 
dissertation as a collection of unresolved contradictions without the connotation that 
they are in need of resolve. That if I am going to take the work of the artists and 
theorists in the dissertation seriously, I need to accept the risk and discomfort that 
comes along with this thinking. And, that perhaps this place of discomfort in being 
unable to settle the contradictions is the place where I need to be: at the crossroads of 
the education and the aesthetic. 
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